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(UN)APPEALING DEFERENCE 
TO THE TAX COURT 
LEANDRA LEDERMAN† 
ABSTRACT 
  The U.S. Tax Court (Tax Court), which hears the vast majority of 
litigated federal tax cases, occupies an unusual place in the federal 
government. It is a federal court located outside of the judicial branch, 
but its decisions are appealable to the federal courts of appeals. This 
odd structure, coupled with the court’s history as an independent 
agency in the executive branch, can give rise to important questions, 
such as the standard of review that should apply to its decisions. In 
particular, should the courts of appeals treat Tax Court decisions the 
same as those of district courts in tax cases, or should they apply a 
more deferential standard analogous to review of agency decisions, as 
the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1943 in Dobson v. Commissioner? 
  Answering the standard-of-review question implicates issues of 
both law and policy. Contrary to some scholarship, this Article argues 
that, as a doctrinal matter, no vestige of the Dobson rule remains and 
that courts of appeals must apply the same standard of judicial review 
that they apply to district courts in nonjury cases. The Article further 
argues that appellate review theory supports that result. The Dobson 
rule was a largely instrumental one designed by U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Robert Jackson to reduce the volume of tax litigation. 
Although tax litigation is unusually decentralized and the Tax Court 
has unique expertise, those differences do not support departing from 
the policies underlying appellate review. Appellate courts therefore 
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should not defer to the interpretations of the Tax Court any more than 
they do to those of the district courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Tax Court (Tax Court), a specialized federal court, is 
an extremely important forum for the resolution of federal tax 
disputes. Although the district courts and the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims share concurrent jurisdiction over many of its cases, the Tax 
Court is the trial court of choice for over 95 percent of litigated 
federal tax cases.1 One important reason why is that only in the Tax 
 
 1. See David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 17, 18 (“Over ninety-five percent of all tax-related litigation is adjudicated in this 
court.”). For example, in fiscal year 2012, there were approximately 30,300 cases pending in the 
Tax Court, 700 in the district courts, and 300 in the Court of Federal Claims, making Tax Court 
cases approximately 96.8 percent of the total number of federal tax cases docketed in trial 
courts. OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION TAX SECTION COURT PROCEDURE COMMITTEE, FY 2012, at 3, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/taxation/taxiq_13mid_ccp_importantdev_
butler_slides.authcheckdam.pdf. The Tax Court is based in Washington, D.C., but its judges 
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Court can a taxpayer avoid paying the claimed tax before litigating.2 
However, other factors may influence forum choice as well.3 
The Tax Court occupies an unusual place in the federal 
government in that it is a federal court whose decisions are 
appealable to the federal courts of appeals,4 yet it is located outside of 
 
hear cases in cities nationwide. See Laro, supra, at 23 (“The Tax Court has nationwide 
jurisdiction over taxpayers regardless of where the individual taxpayer resides or where the 
corporate taxpayer has its principal office or place of business.”).  
 2. See, e.g., Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 158 (1960) (“The Board of Tax Appeals 
was established by Congress in 1924 to permit taxpayers to secure a determination of tax 
liability before payment of the deficiency.”); id. at 193 (“The Government argues, with some 
force, that our tax legislation as a whole contemplates the Tax Court as the forum for 
adjudication of deficiencies, and the District Courts and Court of Claims as the forums for 
adjudication of refund suits. This, in general, is true . . . .”); Kaffenberger v. United States, 314 
F.3d 944, 958 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Full payment of a tax assessment is a prerequisite to suit in 
federal district court; taxpayers may bring prepayment suits only in United States Tax Court.”). 
  A losing taxpayer in Tax Court will owe interest on unpaid amounts due the 
government. Conversely, if the government loses a tax-refund suit, it will owe interest to the 
taxpayer on unpaid amounts. WILLIAM H. HOFFMAN, JR. & JAMES E. SMITH, FEDERAL 
TAXATION 2012: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES 2–13 (2012). The interest rate is the federal short-
term rate plus two or three percentage points. I.R.C. § 6621(a) (2012). 
 3. See Nina J. Crimm, Tax Controversies: Choice of Forum, 9 B.U. J. TAX L. 1, 72 (1991) 
(suggesting that when a forum choice is available in a tax case, factors to consider “include the 
burden of proof required of the parties, availability of a jury trial, applicable legal precedent, 
rules relating to procedure and discovery, persons who can represent the taxpayer and the 
government, expertise of the judges, service-of-process and subpoena powers, and case 
backlog”).  
  One factor that is not typically mentioned as a possible reason for the overwhelming 
selection of the Tax Court is that the notice of deficiency, which is the “ticket to Tax Court” in 
deficiency cases, is required by law to include the last date to petition the Tax Court but is not 
required to mention other courts. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act 
of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, § 3463(a), 112 Stat. 685, 767. The notice typically does not mention the 
alternative of paying the tax in full and pursuing the refund path in order to sue in a federal 
district court or the Court of Federal Claims. See LEANDRA LEDERMAN & STEPHEN W. 
MAZZA, TAX CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 325–26 (3d ed. 2009) 
(reproducing a typical notice of deficiency). Over three-quarters of Tax Court petitions are filed 
pro se. See OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, supra note 1, at 13 (reporting that 23,431 of 29,489 cases 
petitioned in fiscal year 2010 were pro se; in 2011, 23,233 of 29,693 cases were pro se; and in 
2012, 24,521 of 31,282 cases were pro se). Although pro se taxpayer litigants disproportionately 
opt for the informal “small tax case” procedure, taxpayers proceed pro se in approximately two-
thirds of regular cases. See id. (9,684 of 14,492 regular cases petitioned in fiscal year 2010 were 
pro se; in 2011, 9,750 of 14,907 regular cases were pro se; and in 2012, 9,798 out of 15,158 regular 
cases were pro se) (calculations by the author). Many pro se taxpayers may not know about 
litigation options not communicated to them by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). And once 
the taxpayer petitions the Tax Court, the taxpayer cannot change forum. See Crimm, supra, at 
72 (“[I]f the Tax Court is selected and petition is filed, generally no suit for recovery of taxes 
can be instituted in another court.”). 
 4. I.R.C. § 7482(a). 
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the judicial branch.5 Unlike the Court of Federal Claims, for example, 
which is also a legislative court, the Tax Court is not treated as part of 
the judiciary even for administrative purposes.6 Among other things, 
that means that the Tax Court is not subject to the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts, the U.S. Judicial Conference, or the Rules 
Enabling Act,7 but rather is left largely to its own devices.8 
The Tax Court’s unique status and history as an independent 
agency in the executive branch9 can give rise to important questions, 
such as the standard of review that should apply to its decisions.10 In 
particular, should the courts of appeals treat Tax Court decisions the 
same as those of district courts in tax cases—reviewing legal questions 
de novo and factual questions under a “clearly erroneous” 
standard11—or should they apply a more deferential standard 
analogous to review of agency decisions, as was once the case? 
The question of whether to afford special deference to the Tax 
Court, including on issues of law, raises important concerns about the 
role of appellate review. The standard of review may affect both 
litigation outcomes12 and the court taxpayers choose for tax 
 
 5. See id. § 7441 (establishing the Tax Court as an Article I court). 
 6. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 85 n.17 (1995) (“Although the Court of Federal Claims is lodged within the judicial 
branch for administrative purposes that arrangement derives largely from the fact that an 
Article III body, the former United States Court of Claims, previously had exercised much of 
the present Article I court’s jurisdiction. . . . The other Article I courts—the United States Tax 
Court, United States Court of Veterans Appeals, and United States Court of Military 
Appeals—either exist as independent entities or receive administrative support from the 
executive branch.” (citations omitted)). 
 7. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
 8. See Leandra Lederman, Tax Appeal: A Proposal To Make the United States Tax Court 
More Judicial, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1195, 1247–48 (2008) (concluding that the Tax Court 
“seems to have fallen into a gap between the branches of government so that it experiences the 
disciplining effect of neither the provisions—such as the APA and FOIA—that are applicable to 
agencies, nor the bodies or provisions—such as the AOUSC, the Judicial Conference, and the 
Rules Enabling Act—applicable to federal courts”). 
 9. See Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis (pt. 4), 41 
ALB. L. REV. 1, 1, 22–23 (1977) (detailing the evolution of the Tax Court).  
 10. For a recent example of this issue, see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Curcio v. 
Comm’r, 133 S. Ct. 2826 (2013) (No. 12-1085), 2013 WL 859980 (posing the question presented 
as “[w]hat is the standard of appellate review for the Tax Court’s determination of a mixed 
question of law and fact such as whether an expenditure is an ordinary and necessary business 
expense?”). 
 11. See infra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. The standard of review on mixed 
questions of law and fact is harder to pin down. See infra notes 167–70 and accompanying text. 
 12. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Appellate Review in Workplace 
Harassment Cases, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1009, 1025 (1996) (“Courts certainly say that standards of 
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litigation.13 Moreover, the Tax Court still lacks the oversight that 
administrative agencies and Article III courts receive, so most of the 
limited oversight of its actions occurs during the appellate review 
process.14 
The standard-of-review question implicates issues of both law 
and policy. From a policy perspective, answering the question 
requires weighing a variety of considerations that may cut in different 
directions, such as the relative roles of specialized expertise and 
uniformity across courts. As a doctrinal matter, it seems that the 
answer is that courts of appeals should apply the same standard of 
review they apply to district court decisions in nonjury cases. 
However, as discussed below, this rule is not unambiguous, not 
uncontested, and not always followed. 
This Article tackles these doctrinal and policy issues, arguing 
that both considerations counsel according Tax Court decisions no 
more deference than district court decisions receive in tax cases 
decided without a jury. Part I explains why the issue even arises, 
which is a matter of history. In the 1940s—while the Tax Court was 
 
review matter, and I think it’s fair to assume that standards of review can sometimes, even if not 
always, make a difference.”); id. at 1025 n.70 (citing cases and articles stating that the standard 
of review affects case outcomes). 
 13. Professor David Shores has pointed to statistics suggesting that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943), calling for deference to Tax Court 
decisions, did not reduce the volume of Tax Court litigation: 
In 1943, when the share of tax cases decided by the Tax Court could not have 
been affected by Dobson, the Tax Court decided 78.2 percent of all tax cases. In 
1945, when any impact of Dobson on choice of forum would first have had an 
effect on the share of tax cases decided by the Tax Court, it decided 77.3 
percent. In 1948, when presumably all decided tax cases were filed after the 
Dobson decision, it decided 79.3 percent. 
David F. Shores, Rethinking Deferential Review of Tax Court Decisions, 53 TAX LAW. 35, 49 
(1999). Of course, these data do not reflect filings but rather closures of cases, so some pre-
Dobson filings could be in the later set of closures. It is also possible that Dobson effected a 
shift in the type of cases brought to the district courts toward those in which the taxpayer 
thought having a second chance to persuade a court was particularly important. See Abraham S. 
Albrecht & Hyman M. Rubinroit, Choosing Between the Tax Court and the District Court, 21 
CONN. B.J. 177, 180 (1947) (“If the taxpayer is sure of his case in the Tax Court, that is where he 
should bring it. However, if he is not sure of his case there, then the District Court is the place 
to go, so that, if he loses in the District Court, he will at least not be barred from an appeal and 
may still win.”). Of course, the standard of review is only one factor in forum choice, so it might 
not have a significant effect. See Shores, supra, at 50 (“Because other things are never equal, tax 
lawyers’ general preference for full review is an unreliable guide to taxpayers’ choice of forum. 
That preference simply is not sufficiently strong to cause a shift in litigation from the Tax Court 
to the district courts.”). 
 14. See Lederman, supra note 8, at 1215 (“Currently, the Tax Court’s principal source of 
oversight is the appellate review process.”); supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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still an administrative agency—in an effort to reduce tax litigation, 
Justice Robert Jackson led the Supreme Court in holding in Dobson 
v. Commissioner15 that appellate courts must be extremely deferential 
to the Tax Court’s decisions. 
The Dobson rule16 did not survive unscathed for very long, 
however. Congress quickly reversed it, at least in part. Part II of this 
Article considers what current law actually requires of the courts of 
appeals. This doctrinal question warrants a look at the evolution of 
the law since the Dobson decision, which includes both the Dobson-
motivated provision requiring appellate courts to review Tax Court 
decisions “in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of 
the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury”17 and the formal 
change in the status of the Tax Court from an independent agency to 
an Article I court in 1969.18 
Part III of this Article addresses the policy question, looking at 
the role of appellate review generally and then considering possible 
reasons to except the Tax Court from the type of second look that 
appellate review normally affords. It considers the reasons Justice 
Jackson gave in Dobson: the Tax Court’s expertise; the 
decentralization of tax litigation, which can result in lengthy 
percolation of tax issues; and the notion that tax is different from 
other fields such that finality is more important than accuracy in Tax 
Court cases. This Part argues that none of these arguments are 
convincing in light of the institutional role of the Tax Court and the 
purposes of appellate review. The Article concludes that review of 
 
 15. Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). 
 16. See George T. Altman, The Dobson Rule, 21 TUL. L. REV. 527, 531 (1947) (“The 
continuous monotone of Dobson, Dobson, Dobson, Dobson eventually took on the crescendo 
of soldiers’ boots approaching in the night. No longer was it just the Dobson case; it became 
known as the Dobson rule.”). 
 17. I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1) (2012). 
 18. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 487, 730 (codified at 
I.R.C. § 7441) (“There is hereby established, under article I of the Constitution of the United 
States, a court of record to be known as the United States Tax Court.”).  
  The following year, the Tax Court reversed its decision in Lawrence v. Commissioner, 
27 T.C. 713 (1957), which had been reviewed by the full Tax Court, and ruled that it would 
“follow a Court of Appeals decision which is squarely in point where appeal from our decision 
lies to that Court of Appeals and to that court alone.” Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742, 757 
(1970). It is not clear whether the court’s change in status in 1969 contributed to its adoption of 
the Golsen rule. See Deborah Geier, The Emasculated Role of Judicial Precedent in the Tax 
Court and Internal Revenue Service, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 438 (1986) (describing two 
hypotheses for why the change occurred). 
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Tax Court decisions should be on par with the review accorded 
federal district court decisions. 
I.  WHERE DID LIMITED APPELLATE REVIEW OF TAX COURT 
DECISIONS ORIGINATE? 
A. The Start of Appealable Tax Court Decisions 
The history of judicial review of Tax Court decisions is bound up 
in the history of the Tax Court’s development as an administrative 
agency with judicial functions. The Tax Court is the successor to the 
entity known as the Board of Tax Appeals (Board).19 The Board was 
created by statute in 1924 as an independent agency in the executive 
branch20 and charged with adjudicating disputes over federal income 
and profits taxes.21 For the first couple of years of its existence, the 
Board’s decisions were not final and could be collaterally attacked in 
federal court.22 In 1926, Congress provided, instead, for review of 
Board decisions by the courts of appeals,23 as is true today for Tax 
Court decisions.24 At the time, the governing statute gave the courts 
 
 19. Dubroff, supra note 9, at 1. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis (pt. 1), 40 
ALB. L. REV. 7, 7 (1975) (describing the “inadequacy of preexisting institutions” and the need to 
administer federal income and profits taxes as leading to the creation of the Tax Court). 
 22. Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis (pt. 3), 40 ALB. L. 
REV. 253, 258 (1976); see also Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 497 (1943) (“Congress dealt 
cautiously with finality for the Board’s conclusions, going only so far as to provide that in later 
proceedings the findings should be ‘prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.’ So the 
Board’s decisions first came before the courts under a statute which left them free to go into 
both fact and law questions.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Revenue Act of 1924 ch. 234, § 
900(g), 43 Stat. 253, 337)).  
  The Board’s decisions were not subject to direct appeal to the district courts; rather, 
they were subject to collateral attack by starting a de novo proceeding in district court. See 
Revenue Act of 1924 § 274(b), 43 Stat. at 297 (“If the Board determines that there is a 
deficiency, the amount so determined shall be assessed and shall be paid upon notice and 
demand from the collector.”); id. § 900(g), 43 Stat. at 337 (“In any proceeding in court under 
sections 274, 279, 308, or 312, and in any suit or proceeding by a taxpayer to recover any 
amounts paid in pursuance of a decision of the Board, the findings of the Board shall be prima 
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.”); id. § 1014, 43 Stat. at 343 (providing limitations 
periods for refund suits); see also Dubroff, supra, at 260–61 (explaining the procedure and 
offering possible explanations for the lack of authorization for a direct appeal). Thus, it is not 
technically correct that “[a]ppeals from the Board of Tax Appeals were heard by the federal 
district courts,” as stated in Andre L. Smith, Deferential Review of Tax Court Decisions of Law: 
Promoting Expertise, Uniformity, and Impartiality, 58 TAX LAW. 361, 368 (2005). 
 23. Dubroff, supra note 22, at 262. 
 24. I.R.C. § 7482(a) (2012). 
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of appeals “power to affirm or, if the decision of the Board is not in 
accordance with law, to modify or to reverse the decision of the 
Board, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing, as justice 
may require.”25 The distinct language with respect to modifications 
and reversals was apparently intentional: “The reports of the Ways 
and Means and Finance Committees indicated that this language was 
intended to limit judicial review to questions of law, a limitation 
comparable to that provided in appeals from determinations of the 
Federal Trade Commission.”26 However, these reports also included 
some evidentiary issues under the “law” umbrella. The House and 
Senate Reports contained similar language, with the House Report 
stating: 
The court upon review may consider, for example, questions as to 
the constitutionality of the substantive law applied, the 
constitutionality of the procedure used, failure to observe the 
procedure required by law, the proper interpretation and 
application of the statute or any regulation having the force of law, 
the existence of at least some evidence to support the findings of 
fact, and the validity of any ruling upon the admissibility of 
evidence . . . .27 
During the floor debate on the appellate review provision, 
Senator Albert Cummins expressed concern over the constitutionality 
of allowing an appeal from an administrative agency to a court.28 The 
 
 25. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1003(b), 44 Stat. 9, 110. The legislative history of the 
1926 amendment reveals that the restriction of reversals to questions of law was an intentional 
policy decision reflecting concern about the existence of authority to review decisions of an 
administrative agency. See S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 36–37 (1926); H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 19–20 
(1925). 
  The statute did not say “that questions of fact and mixed questions of law and fact were 
final so long as they had any warrant in the record,” as reported by Professor Andre Smith. See 
Smith, supra note 22, at 369 (citing David F. Shores, Deferential Review of Tax Court Decisions: 
Dobson Revisited, 49 TAX LAW. 629, 637 (1996)). The statute was silent regarding questions of 
fact but explicit regarding questions of law. See Revenue Act of 1926 § 1003, 44 Stat. at 110; see 
also I.R.C. § 1141 (1946) (explaining that federal appellate courts have the “power to affirm or, 
if the decision of the Board is not in accordance with law, to modify or to reverse the decision of 
the Board”). It is the Dobson opinion that stated that the Tax Court’s “decision, of course, must 
have ‘warrant in the record’ and a reasonable basis in the law.” Dobson, 320 U.S. at 501. 
 26. Dubroff, supra note 22, at 264 (footnote omitted). 
 27. H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 19–20; see S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 37.  
 28. See 67 CONG. REC. 3756 (1926) (statement of Sen. Cummins) (“I can not conceive, Mr. 
President, of a proceeding in an administrative board, even if it is quasi judicial, in which a 
review is attempted by a judicial tribunal. . . . I have the very gravest doubts about the 
constitutionality of the entire provision.”). 
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Senate Report seems to address this concern, arguing that the Board 
was in essence a court, while nonetheless advocating limited review of 
its decisions, just as would be the case for an administrative body.  
In the view of the committee the decisions of the board are judicial 
and not legislative or administrative determinations. Review of 
judicial decisions may be had by direct appeal to the 
courts . . . . Such review of a judicial as distinguished from a 
legislative or administrative determination may be had as to either 
questions of law or fact. The proposed procedure, however, for 
reasons of policy and not of law, limits court review solely to 
questions of law . . . .29 
Professor Harold Dubroff has described the committee reports 
as “read[ing] very much like briefs in favor of sustaining the validity 
of the statute.”30 A few years later, in Old Colony Trust Co. v. 
Commissioner,31 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
(under Article III) of appeals from the Board to the courts of 
appeals.32 
After the appellate review statute was enacted in 1926, no major 
dispute about it arose until the Supreme Court’s controversial 
decision in Dobson v. Commissioner in 1943.33 Before Dobson, the 
Court had established that the Tax Court’s factual findings were not 
reviewable on appeal, but that questions of law and mixed questions 
of law and fact were reviewable.34 Dobson therefore marked a turning 
point in the standard of review. 
 
 29. S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 37 (emphasis added). 
 30. Dubroff, supra note 22, at 267. 
 31. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). 
 32. See id. at 722 (“It is suggested that the proceedings before the Circuit Courts of 
Appeals . . . on a petition to review are not and can not be judicial, for they involve ‘no case or 
controversy,’ and without this a Circuit Court of Appeals, which is a constitutional court is 
incapable of exercising its judicial function. This view of the nature of the proceedings we can 
not sustain.” (citation omitted)); see also Geier, supra note 18, at 431 n.28 (describing these 
events). 
 33. See Dubroff, supra note 22, at 265 (explaining that the standard of review of Tax Court 
opinions was uncontroversial until Dobson). 
 34. For example, the Court stated in 1935: 
The Court of Appeals is without power, on review of proceedings of the Board of Tax 
Appeals, to make any findings of fact. . . . The function of the court is to decide 
whether the correct rule of law was applied to the facts found; and whether there was 
substantial evidence before the Board to support the findings made. Unless the 
finding of the Board involves a mixed question of law and fact, the court may not 
properly substitute its own judgment for that of the Board. 
Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U.S. 123, 131 (1935) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see also 
Bogardus v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 34, 38–39 (1937) (finding that whether a payment was 
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B. The Rise of Limited Review: Dobson v. Commissioner 
Writing for the Court in Dobson, Justice Robert Jackson tried to 
turn the tide on appellate review doctrine. The Dobson opinion 
states, “[E]ven a casual survey of decisions in tax cases, now over 
5,000 in number, will demonstrate that courts, including this Court, 
have not paid the scrupulous deference to the tax laws’ admonitions 
of finality which they have to similar provisions in statutes relating to 
other tribunals.”35 That was the lead-in to what many regarded as a 
dramatic change in the standard of review of Tax Court decisions, as 
described below. 
Dobson involved consolidated cases on stipulated facts36 raising 
what is known as the “tax benefit rule.” The taxpayer in the lead case, 
James Collins, had purchased stock in 1929 and sold blocks of it in 
1930 and 1931, sustaining deductible losses of approximately $41,600 
and $28,163.37 However, the losses did not produce a tax benefit for 
Mr. Collins because his returns for those years would have reported 
net losses even without those deductions.38 In 1936, Collins “learned 
of facts indicating that he had been induced to purchase [the stock] by 
fraudulent representations.”39 He brought a lawsuit that settled in 
1939 for approximately $45,000, a portion of which was allocable to 
the stock sold in the years in question.40 He did not report the 
allocated amounts as income, and appealed to the Board the 
government’s determination that they constituted gross income, 
arguing in part that the deductions had produced no tax benefit.41 The 
 
compensation or an excludible gift was a legal or mixed question); Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil 
Co., 300 U.S. 481, 491 (1937) (“The ultimate finding [of the Board] is a conclusion of law or at 
least a determination of a mixed question of law and fact. It is to be distinguished from the 
findings of primary, evidentiary or circumstantial facts. It is subject to judicial review and, on 
such review, the court may substitute its judgment for that of the board.”). 
 35. Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 494 (1943). 
 36. See Dobson v. Comm’r, 46 B.T.A. 770, 770–71 (1942), rev’d sub nom. Harwick v. 
Comm’r, 133 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1943), rev’d sub nom. Dobson, 320 U.S. 489; Estate of Collins v. 
Comm’r, 46 B.T.A. 765, 765–66 (1942), rev’d sub nom. Harwick, 133 F.2d 732, rev’d sub nom. 
Dobson, 320 U.S. 489. One commentator notes, “Since the Dobson case involved a stipulation 
of all the ultimate facts, it must be seriously questioned whether it was at all possible, under the 
common law and over a century of express statutory law, that there could be presented anything 
but a clear question of law.” Hugh C. Bickford, The Trial of the Tax Court, 23 TAXES 482, 491 
(1945). 
 37. Dobson, 320 U.S. at 491. 
 38. Id. at 491–92. 
 39. Id. at 491. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 491–92. 
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Board agreed with Collins’s argument,42 but the Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that the tax benefit rule 
was an uncodified equitable doctrine.43 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s 
argument that the taxpayer should recognize gain in the amount of 
the settlement proceeds because the deduction reduced the taxpayer’s 
stock basis to zero, reasoning as follows:44  
[T]he statute contains no such fixed rule as the Government would 
have us read into it. It does not specify the circumstances or manner 
in which adjustments of the basis are to be made, but merely 
provides that “Proper adjustment . . . shall in all cases be made” for 
the items named if “properly chargeable to capital account.” What, 
in the circumstances of this case, was a proper adjustment of the basis 
was thus purely an accounting problem and therefore a question of 
fact for the Tax Court to determine.45 
Accordingly, the Court held that the amount of any basis adjustment 
to the taxpayer’s stock was an unreviewable question of fact, rather 
than a question of law that the court of appeals could examine.46 It 
stated that “[w]e are not adopting any rule of tax benefits. . . . The 
error of the court below consisted of treating as a rule of law what we 
think is only a question of proper tax accounting.”47 The Court’s 
approach was rather odd because, as Professor Myron Grauer has 
explained, “the Dobson Court approved the equitable principle of the 
exclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule and the transactional 
accounting that it entails, but did so in a manner that enabled it to 
deny that it was engaging in transactional accounting.”48 He adds: 
 
 42. Id. at 492. 
 43. Id.; see Harwick v. Comm’r, 133 F.2d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 1943), rev’d sub nom. Dobson, 
320 U.S. 489 (“We think the allowance of deductions from gross income cannot be made to 
depend upon general equitable considerations, such as are involved in the tax benefit 
theory . . . .”). 
 44. Dobson, 320 U.S. at 503. 
 45. Id. at 503–04 (emphasis added). Currently, I.R.C. § 1016, on “[a]djustments to basis,” 
contains the following language: “Proper adjustment in respect of the property shall in all cases 
be made—(1) for expenditures, receipts, losses, or other items, properly chargeable to capital 
account.” I.R.C. § 1016(a) (2012). An entirely different provision, I.R.C. § 111, addresses 
“[r]ecovery of tax benefit items.” Id. § 111. 
 46. Dobson, 320 U.S. at 506–07. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Myron C. Grauer, The Supreme Court’s Approach to Annual and Transactional 
Accounting for Income Taxes: A Common Law Malfunction in a Statutory System?, 21 GA. L. 
REV. 329, 379 (1986). 
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Indeed, the intriguing question here is why the Court decided to 
treat the tax issue as if it were merely a factual question. . . . The 
Court . . . noted that there were sound policy reasons for paying 
great deference to the expertise of the Tax Court. The value of 
paying deference to Tax Court decisions, however, does not explain 
why the tax issue in Dobson was treated as a factual one.49 
The answer to that question seems to lie more with Justice 
Jackson than with the facts of Dobson.50 As Professor Kirk Stark has 
explained, Jackson’s early career included serving as Chief Counsel of 
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (Bureau)51—the predecessor of the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS)52—and as Assistant Attorney 
General of the Tax Division of the Department of Justice,53 although 
Jackson was primarily a litigator and did not consider himself a tax 
expert.54 Justice Jackson’s experience led him to believe that there 
was too much tax litigation.55 Part of the reason, in Justice Jackson’s 
view, was the opportunity that taxpayers had (and still have) to 
choose among three trial-level fora.56 In the concluding section of an 
article published while he was at the Bureau, eight years before the 
Dobson decision, Justice Jackson complained about the abundance of 
tax litigation and posed several seemingly rhetorical questions that 
showed the limited role he envisioned for the courts of appeals in tax 
litigation: 
 
 49. Id. at 376. 
 50. See Kirk J. Stark, The Unfulfilled Tax Legacy of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 54 TAX L. 
REV. 171, 221 (2001) (“If the Tax Court were given the final say on a broader range of disputed 
tax questions, Jackson believed, much of the complexity arising out of excessive appellate 
litigation could be curbed. The difficulty lay in locating a case through which this goal could be 
operationalized.”). 
 51. Id. at 173. 
 52. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, IRS HISTORICAL FACT BOOK: 
A CHRONOLOGY: 1646–1992, at 158 (1993).  
 53. Stark, supra note 50, at 173. 
 54. See id. at 179 (“Robert Jackson neither began nor ended his government service with 
any special degree of technical tax expertise. . . . In his speeches, writings, and autobiographical 
notes, Jackson repeatedly disclaimed any specialized knowledge of tax law.”). 
 55. Id. at 180. One contemporary commentator pointed to the expansion of the tax laws as 
the reason for the increase in litigation. See Bickford, supra note 36, at 491 (“In 1913, the 
Federal Revenue Act covered a few pages. The Internal Revenue Code today contains several 
thousand sections covering hundreds of pages . . . . Can all of this great body of statutory law 
possibly be interpreted and enforced without a vast increase in judicial business?”). Bickford 
argued that “[t]he purpose of the courts is to hear disputes whenever they arise and decide 
them. To perform this duty they must be as freely open as the doors of the churches.” Id. 
 56. Stark, supra note 50, at 186–87. 
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We are getting too much law, and too many kinds of law, and from 
too many sources, for tax administration to be simple, or the law 
clear. Should we reserve to the Supreme Court only constitutional 
questions in tax matters? Should matters of statutory construction 
be settled by a tax court, instead of by the twelve Circuit Courts of 
Appeal, with their frequent conflict of viewpoint? Should questions 
of fact be finally settled by the finding of the Board of Tax Appeals? 
Cannot questions of valuation be settled administratively?57 
Justice Jackson’s experiences seem to have led him to value 
finality—having some answer to what the proper tax rule was—over 
notions of the “correctness” of the answer.58 In part, that may have 
been because, to protect the federal fisc, the government took 
inconsistent positions in different cases, even on major tax issues of 
the day, such as important timing questions under the income tax and 
the recently enacted gift tax.59 Jackson saw no way around this 
problem, as different taxpayers are not required to maintain 
consistent positions on an issue.60 
Justice Jackson’s tax litigation experience also led him to respect 
the Board of Tax Appeals. He appeared only once before the Board,61 
but it was in a high-profile, highly political case involving former 
Treasury Department (Treasury) Secretary Andrew Mellon,62 who 
had helped create the Board just over a decade earlier.63 The political 
 
 57. Robert H. Jackson, Equity in the Administration of Federal Taxes, 13 TAXES 641, 686 
(1935). 
 58. See Stark, supra note 50, at 206–07 (“The object of judicial intervention . . . Jackson 
seemed to conclude, was not so much to ponder the theoretical advantages of one tax theory 
over another, but rather to facilitate a clean and quick resolution of legal controversies.”). 
 59. See id. at 204–06 (discussing the income-tax question of whether a tenant’s 
improvements to property are gross income when the tenant abandons the property (or only 
when the property is later sold), as well as the gift-tax question of whether a gift to a trust is 
complete for gift-tax purposes while the donor retains the power to change the beneficiaries of 
the trust (or not until that power is relinquished)). 
 60. See Jackson, supra note 57, at 644 (explaining, in the article he wrote while at the 
Bureau, that otherwise, “[i]f we guess wrong [what the courts will hold], and a lot of cases expire 
by limitation, our position would be indefensible”). As an example of cases presenting statute-
of-limitations issues, Jackson cited a set of cases in which a husband bequeathed money to a 
trustee, the income from which was to be paid to his widow for life. Id. Several courts held that 
the income stream was not taxable to the widow. Id. The IRS then pursued the trustee for tax 
on that income, but the Supreme Court said that the widow, not the trustee, was the proper 
taxpayer. Id. 
 61. Stark, supra note 50, at 180. 
 62. Id. at 180–81, 189. 
 63. See id. at 189.  
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nature of the Mellon litigation posed a test for the Board’s 
independence. For two years, Jackson immersed himself in the case.64 
Ultimately, the Board reached a split decision, allowing some of 
Mellon’s deductions but ruling for the government on points that 
resulted in a deficiency of approximately $500,000,65 a fraction of the 
approximately $3 million claimed by the Bureau.66 Moreover, the 
Board decided the case in a manner that “successfully converted what 
began as a hugely controversial political battle into a highly technical 
analysis of complex tax issues,” issuing a “124-page opinion [that] 
provide[d] excruciating detail on the Mellon transactions and, on the 
whole, offer[ed] a reasoned, balanced analysis of the issues.”67 As a 
result, the case established to the public, and probably to Jackson, the 
Board’s technical expertise and its independence from both Mellon 
and the Bureau.68  
Justice Jackson was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1941.69 
On the Court, his early work in tax cases reflected his belief in the 
importance of not disrupting the tax administration process.70 In 
addition, he continued to adhere to the view that there was not 
necessarily a single correct answer in tax cases, and that delay in 
obtaining a clear rule disrupted tax administration.71 As Professor 
Stark has explained, 
In Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc., a corporate tax case decided 
in his first term on the Court, Jackson prepared an unpublished 
concurring opinion that foreshadowed his famous Dobson 
opinion. . . . Jackson wrote that tax is not only a complex field of 
law, but one in which the legal determinations required to be made 
 
 64. Id. at 190. 
 65. Id. at 194. 
 66. Id. at 189. 
 67. Id. at 194. 
 68. See id. It would be interesting to know what Justice Jackson would think of the current 
Tax Court, which, as an Article I court, has at least as much independence as it did in Jackson’s 
era, but less accountability. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 69. See generally Nomination of Robert H. Jackson To Be an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court, in 4 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS 
ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE 
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916–1972 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 
1975). 
 70. See Stark, supra note 50, at 211 (“This early memo reveals Jackson’s impatience with 
having the Court involved in picayune tax cases and suggests, perhaps, a bias in favor of 
handling such matters administratively.”). 
 71. See id. at 221. 
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are “essentially arbitrary.” “The line between what is taxable and 
what is not,” Jackson wrote, “is not necessarily drawn by 
reason. . . . It would not be possible to demonstrate that in abstract 
rightness or wrongness our opinions are superior to those of the 
Board of Tax Appeals.”72  
Justice Jackson gave a copy of that draft concurrence to his first 
law clerk, John Costelloe, with the assignment to research the scope 
of appellate review of Board decisions.73 Costelloe concluded that 
appellate courts should not defer to the Board’s decisions.74 Professor 
Phil Neal, Justice Jackson’s second law clerk, reports, “John told me 
that after reading the memorandum, Justice Jackson had walked into 
his office with the memorandum in hand, chuckling, and said: ‘Well, 
John, that may be the law now but it won’t be for long if I can help 
it.’”75 
It appears, then, that Justice Jackson was simply waiting for a 
vehicle to limit the review of Tax Court decisions, and the one he 
chose was Dobson.76 In his initial Dobson draft, Justice Jackson took 
the approach that Tax Court matters were essentially unreviewable, 
leaving the appellate courts with “little more than a proofreading 
function. Did the Tax Court make a clear-cut mistake in reading the 
statute? If not, then the decision must be affirmed.”77 
Justice Jackson sought a unanimous Dobson opinion, but he 
could not have obtained that with his initial draft, which Chief Justice 
Stone strongly opposed.78 Moreover, although Justice Frankfurter was 
 
 72. Id. at 222 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc., Nos. 644–
46, at 2–3 (U.S. 1942) (Jackson, J., unpublished concurring opinion)). 
 73. John Q. Barrett, Justice Jackson on “What the Law’s Going To Be”—at Least Until Its 
“Gelding,” 6 GREEN BAG 2D 125, 125–26 (2003). 
 74. See id. at 127 (noting Costelloe’s “recommendation that appellate courts, or at least the 
Supreme Court, should continue not to accord much administrative finality to [Board] 
decisions”). 
 75. Phil C. Neal, Justice Jackson: A Law Clerk’s Recollections, 68 ALB. L. REV. 549, 553–54 
(2005). 
 76. See Stark, supra note 50, at 221 (referring to Jackson’s search for a case to 
operationalize his goal of increased deference to Tax Court decisions); cf. Bickford, supra note 
36, at 484 (pointing out that “the Supreme Court violated the very rule which it decided, by thus 
considering an issue not raised below”). 
 77. Stark, supra note 50, at 227. 
 78. See id. at 225 (“The most vigorous opponent to [Jackson’s] initial draft opinion was 
Chief Justice Stone. In response to Jackson’s draft, Stone prepared a concurring opinion that 
essentially restated the Court’s traditional approach to judicial review of Tax Court 
decisions . . . .”). 
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generally sympathetic to Jackson’s approach, he parted company with 
Jackson on the treatment of mixed questions of law and fact: 
“Merely because questions of law are mixed up with so-called 
questions of fact,” Frankfurter wrote, “does not withdraw their 
determinations from the courts. It would be too easy otherwise for 
the Tax Court to mix them up. The remedy is not to leave such 
admixtures to the Tax Court. The remedy is to insist on proper 
findings from the Tax Court.”79 
To get Justices Frankfurter and Stone to join the opinion, Justice 
Jackson drafted compromise language.80 That resulted in a rather 
murky decision,81 as Professor Kirk Stark explains: 
The opinion nods toward Stone’s view by characterizing as a 
reviewable “clear-cut question of law” whether “applicable statutes 
and regulations properly interpreted forbid” the Tax Court’s ruling. 
The insertion of the words “properly interpreted” essentially 
preserved de novo review for any judge who wanted it. Jackson’s 
side of the argument reemerges later in the opinion, however, when 
he states that “[w]here no statute or regulation controls, the Tax 
Court’s selection of the course to follow is no more reviewable than 
any other question of fact.” This language suggests that statutory 
ambiguity, or the absence of a statutory provision, leaves the matter 
within the Tax Court’s province.82 
 
 79. Id. at 227 (quoting Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter to Robert H. Jackson 3 (Oct. 
4, 1943)). 
 80. The published Dobson opinion states, in part: 
Whatever latitude exists in resolving questions such as those of proper accounting, 
treating a series of transactions as one for tax purposes, or treating apparently 
separate ones as single in their tax consequences, exists in the Tax Court and not in 
the regular courts; when the court cannot separate the elements of a decision so as to 
identify a clear-cut mistake of law, the decision of the Tax Court must stand. In view 
of the division of functions between the Tax Court and reviewing courts it is of course 
the duty of the Tax Court to distinguish with clarity between what it finds as fact and 
what conclusion it reaches on the law. In deciding law questions courts may properly 
attach weight to the decision of points of law by an administrative body having special 
competence to deal with the subject matter. The Tax Court is informed by experience 
and kept current with tax evolution and needs by the volume and variety of its work.  
Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 501–02 (1943). 
 81. See Stark, supra note 50, at 227 (“Jackson reworked the Dobson draft in an effort to 
secure Stone’s and Frankfurter’s full accord. The final product, not surprisingly, is characterized 
more by compromise than clarity.”). 
 82. Id. at 228 (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 
Dobson, 310 U.S. at 492–93, 502). The Court also held, “The error of the court below consisted 
of treating as a rule of law what we think is only a question of proper tax accounting.” Dobson, 
320 U.S. at 506–07. However, it did not explain why that meant the question was a factual, not a 
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C. Criticism of the Dobson Rule 
The Dobson decision was quickly criticized, including by leading 
commentators.83 Among other things, scholars pointed to the 
difference between the statute’s language of “not in accordance with 
law” and the Dobson rule’s “clear-cut mistake of law.”84 The Dobson 
rule also meant that review of Tax Court decisions was more limited 
than review of district court decisions in tax cases,85 which seems not 
to have been the practice until then.86 For example, one commentator 
wrote in 1945 that “[i]n all of [the thousands of appeals from the 
Board], until the Dobson decision, the rule stated by the legislature 
 
legal, one. See Randolph E. Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 
57 HARV. L. REV. 753, 767–68 (1944). 
 83. See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV. 
1153, 1170–73 (1944) (arguing, in part, that “[e]ven if the Dobson rule were clear and 
understandable in its application, and even if decisions of the Tax Court were always decisions 
of all the court, the Dobson rule would not solve the problem with which we are confronted”); 
Paul, supra note 82, at 753–54 (“The [Dobson] case started life as a humble, if engaging, income 
tax dispute and was miraculously transformed by the Supreme Court into an all-embracing 
essay on the steadily expanding evils of tax litigation and the pressing need for judicial 
reorientation.” (footnote omitted)).  
 84. Geier, supra note 18, at 434. A 2005 article argued that “as a practical matter, in 1926 
Congress re-designed the Board of Tax Appeals to stand on almost equal ground with the 
circuit courts. The circuit courts’ remaining function in tax controversies was to ensure that 
none of the Board’s conclusions of law were clear-cut mistakes.” Smith, supra note 22, at 369. 
However, as Professor Geier’s article notes, it was Dobson, not the statute, that used the phrase 
“clear-cut mistake of law.” Geier, supra note 18, at 434 (citing Dobson, 320 U.S. at 502); cf. 
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1003(b), 44 Stat. 9, 110 (providing the courts of appeals the 
“power to affirm or, if the decision of the Board is not in accordance with law, to modify or to 
reverse the decision of the Board” (emphasis added)). In addition, the Board, as a trial court, 
was more equal with the district courts than with the courts of appeals. See Bickford, supra note 
36, at 485–86 (“[T]he Tax Court was . . . created, and Congress has consistently maintained it, as 
a practical part of the judicial system to sit in the same fashion as, and contemporaneous with, 
the District Courts.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 85. Dubroff, supra note 9, at 26–27. 
 86. See Note, Controversy Between the Tax Court and the Courts of Appeals: Is the Tax 
Court Bound by the Precedent of Its Reviewing Court?, 7 DUKE L.J. 45, 47 n.10 (1957) (“By the 
time the Board of Tax Appeals was established, the circuit courts were used to reviewing the tax 
cases from the district courts in the same manner that they reviewed all other cases, and they 
continued to exercise this type of review over the Board until Dobson v. Commissioner.” 
(citation omitted)). One commentator argued that, before Dobson, the courts of appeals 
actually accorded less respect to the Tax Court’s findings than they did to the district courts. See 
Warren F. Wattles, Federal Tax Cases upon Appeal: The Rise and Demise of the Dobson Rule, 1 
U. FLA. L. REV. 333, 337 (1948) (“More than once the reveiwing [sic] court decided a fact 
question or a mixed question of fact and law, essentially as if the appellate court were the trial 
court and the Tax Court but a panel of special masters.”). 
LEDERMAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2014  9:16 AM 
1852 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1835 
has been adhered to, as expressed in the first decision on the 
question, namely, that questions of law were fully subject to review.”87 
Randolph Paul, who was a tax advisor at Treasury,88 wrote a 
lengthy article tearing apart the opinion.89 He challenged Dobson’s 
statement that the Tax Court’s decision must have “a reasonable basis 
in the law” to be upheld.90 He argued: 
[I]t may mean that a Tax Court decision must be respected on 
appeal if it is rooted in a reasonable legal interpretation regardless 
of whether the appellate court would subscribe to that interpretation 
as an original proposition. . . . Obviously this view is a drastic 
departure from accepted canons of review in the tax field, for the 
Tax Court’s control of the law may become practically coterminous 
with its control of the facts although Congress itself has very 
definitely intended otherwise.91 
Another contemporary commentator, Louis Eisenstein, argued 
in 1945 (while the Tax Court technically was still an administrative 
agency), that the Dobson decision reflected deference to the wrong 
agency: 
One must constantly remember . . . that the Dobson decision is a 
poorly disguised effort to rescue the Supreme Court from the 
growing demands of tax litigation and, at the same time, augment 
the scope of administrative finality. In order to accomplish both 
these purposes, the Supreme Court turned to the Tax Court as the 
administrative authority on taxation. . . . The Dobson decision is 
essentially a reaction against the failure of administration by the 
Treasury, which could have narrowed the area of judicial 
intervention. Nevertheless, the Dobson case is not the answer to the 
Supreme Court’s prayer. . . .  
. . . . 
 
 87. Bickford, supra note 36, at 489 (citation omitted) (citing Avery v. Comm’r, 22 F.2d 6 
(5th Cir. 1927)); see also id. at 490 (“[A]ll questions of law are reviewable without limitation or 
restriction for the simple reason that Congress gave jurisdiction to review all questions of law and 
said so in the statute and in its reports.”). 
 88. Stark, supra note 50, at 229. 
 89. See generally Paul, supra note 82. He stated, for example, that “[t]he obvious moral of 
this sad chapter . . . is that judicial haste may very easily make waste. It is hardly the course of 
wisdom to escape from the frying pan into the fire.” Id. at 796.  
 90. Id. at 778–79; see Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 501 (1943). 
 91. Paul, supra note 82, at 778. 
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. . . [A] body which is non-administrative in character cannot 
perform the administrative functions apparently contemplated by 
the Dobson decision. . . . If the concept of administration includes 
the authoritative formulation of subsidiary rules by a rule-making 
agency, the Tax Court is no more administrative in character than a 
district court.92 
Eisenstein argued that deference was instead warranted for Treasury 
regulations, in line with the rest of administrative law.93 In that regard, 
Eisenstein seems prescient, given the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision 
in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United 
States,94 which held that Treasury regulations warrant the same level 
of deference as those of other agencies.95  
The Dobson rule was a strange one, in part because the Court 
provided no test for distinguishing issues of fact from issues of law.96 
In his article, Paul particularly criticized the Court’s use of the 
law/fact distinction, stating in part: 
The circuit court—and apparently the Tax Court as well as the 
litigants concerned—had assumed without any qualms that the 
relevance and application of the tax benefit rule raised a pure 
question of law. Mr. Justice Jackson, however, with the concurrence 
 
 92. Louis Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration, 58 HARV. L. 
REV. 477, 540–42 (1945) (footnote omitted). 
 93. See id. at 528 (“[T]he central issue is whether an enlightened administrator could finally 
arrive at the result actually reached, and not whether the issued regulation is the most 
reasonable which could have been devised to suit the occasion. . . . This view reflects nothing 
especially novel, except as it extends the teachings of administrative law to the realm of 
taxation.”).  
 94. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). 
 95. See id. at 713 (“Aside from our past citation of [tax-specific case] National Muffler 
[Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 462 (1979)], Mayo has not advanced any justification 
for applying a less deferential standard of review to Treasury Department regulations than we 
apply to the rules of any other agency. In the absence of such justification, we are not inclined to 
carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only.”).  
  The changes that have occurred since Eisenstein wrote only underscore his conclusion 
that the appropriate locus for deference within tax administration is Treasury, not the Tax 
Court. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), has 
become the leading Supreme Court case on deference to agency rulemaking, and the Court 
applied it in Mayo to the Treasury Department. See Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713. Most importantly, 
the Tax Court has ceased to be an agency within the executive branch even as a technical 
matter, having been denominated an Article I (legislative) court in 1969. See infra note 151 and 
accompanying text. 
 96. See Ralph S. Rice, Law, Fact, and Taxes: Review of Tax Court Decisions Under Section 
1141 of the Internal Revenue Code, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 439, 446 n.41 (1951) (“In the entire 
course of the doctrine’s reign, the court never revealed the criteria by which a clear-cut question 
of law might be distinguished from other questions.”). 
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of all his brethren, neatly demolishes this assumption by moving the 
tax benefit rule from the realm of law to the realm of fact. This 
transmutation of law into fact is really the cornerstone of the 
decision. But there still remains the stubborn question whether the 
Supreme Court or the circuit court was correct in the choice of 
categories.97 
On the ground, Dobson proved challenging to apply.98 The courts 
of appeals struggled with the Dobson rule,99 sometimes criticizing it 
openly.100 The Supreme Court itself applied the doctrine 
haphazardly,101 sometimes applying it to one issue but not others in 
the same case; sometimes “buttress[ing] its reliance on the Dobson 
rule by an independent judgment as to the merits of the Tax Court 
decision”; sometimes finding that Dobson did not govern its review; 
and sometimes failing to mention Dobson at all.102 The Justices also 
sometimes disagreed with each other as to whether Dobson deference 
applied.103 
 
 97. Paul, supra note 82, at 765. 
 98. See Geier, supra note 18, at 434 (“Dobson complicated the review process since a 
threshold determination was required as to whether the Tax Court question was reviewable.”). 
 99. See Griswold, supra note 83, at 1170 n.51 (“The effect of the Dobson case on the circuit 
courts of appeals to date can only be described as chaos.”); Wattles, supra note 86, at 340–41 
(“The response of circuit courts of appeals to the Dobson rule was varied. . . . Some [courts of 
appeals] continued to reverse the Tax Court with considerable frequency.”). 
 100. For example, the Second Circuit wrote in one case, “There remains only the vexed 
question whether we should yield our own judgment to that of the Tax Court. . . . Concededly, it 
is impossible to lay down any general principle to distinguish those situations in which a 
‘clearcut question of law’ arises . . . .” Comm’r v. Nat’l Carbide Corp., 167 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 
1948) (footnote omitted), aff’d., 336 U.S. 422 (1949); see also Dubroff, supra note 9, at 27 
(noting that appellate courts criticized Dobson); Wattles, supra note 86, at 340 (“The Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit . . . [i]n inimitably ironical language . . . which none 
who read might miss, . . . paid its respects to the Dobson doctrine.” (citing Am. Coast Line, Inc., 
v. Comm’r, 159 F.2d 665, 668–69 (2d Cir. 1947))).  
 101. Robert C. Brown, The Nature of the Tax Court of the United States, 10 U. PITT. L. REV. 
298, 307–08 (1949) (“With the Supreme Court first enunciating such an absurd doctrine, and 
then ignoring it whenever they felt like it—indeed applying it often if not usually only in the 
most absurd situations—it is small wonder that the courts of appeal could make little of the 
doctrine.”). 
 102. See Rice, supra note 96, at 446 n.41 (collecting cases).  
 103. See Paul, supra note 82, at 792 (“[S]even Justices [in Security Flour Mills Co. v. 
Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944),] held the Dobson rule of finality inapplicable while the 
other two, Justices Douglas and Jackson, were equally convinced that the Dobson decision 
governed. Neither group made any attempt to justify its views, although what clearly was fact to 
one group was obviously law to the other.” (footnote omitted)). 
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II.  MODERN LAW ON APPELLATE REVIEW OF TAX COURT 
DECISIONS 
A. Was the Dobson Rule Legislatively Overturned in 1948? 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given even the Supreme Court’s 
inconsistent adherence to the Dobson rule, Congress soon acted on 
complaints that Dobson caused problems for tax litigation. In 1948, 
Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code (Code), providing for 
review of Tax Court decisions “in the same manner and to the same 
extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a 
jury.”104 This might seem to have put an end to Dobson deference. 
However, Congress left untouched the subsection providing the 
original standard of review; it still states, “Upon such review, such 
courts shall have power to affirm or, if the decision of the Tax Court 
is not in accordance with law, to modify or to reverse the decision of 
the Tax Court, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing, as 
justice may require.”105 Professor David Shores has raised the 
question of whether this means that Congress left the Dobson rule 
untouched as to questions of law,106 as at least one court has 
suggested.107 He has argued that this was Congress’s intent.108 
 
 104. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 36, 62 Stat. 869, 991 (codified as amended at I.R.C. 
§ 7482(a)(1) (2012)). Section 7482(a)(1) provides in full: 
The United States Courts of Appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of the 
Tax Court, except as provided in section 1254 of Title 28 of the United States Code, 
in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil 
actions tried without a jury; and the judgment of any such court shall be final, except 
that it shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon 
certiorari, in the manner provided in section 1254 of Title 28 of the United States 
Code. 
I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1). 
 105. I.R.C. § 7482(c)(1). 
 106. See Shores, supra note 25, at 652–53 (“If, as appears to be the case, the Senate intended 
to overrule Dobson with respect to questions of fact only, while the House intended to overrule 
Dobson with respect to questions of fact as well as law, which intent should control in 
construing the statute?”). 
 107. See ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 482 F.2d 150, 155 n.3 (3d Cir. 1973) (“Although 26 
U.S.C. § 7482(a) had as its express purpose the modification of Dobson with respect to review 
of findings of fact by the Tax Court, the statute does not profess to affect that portion of 
Dobson which discusses appellate review of questions of law.”). 
 108. See Shores, supra note 25, at 673 (“That Congress intended to modify rather than 
overrule Dobson when it amended subsection (a) in 1948 is made plain by the retention of 
subsection (c).”); see also id. at 653 (“At a minimum one can say that the language and history 
of the 1948 amendment leave the door open for the courts to construe the amendment as 
limited to providing a new standard for review of factual issues (‘clearly erroneous’) while 
retaining the Dobson standard for legal issues (entitled to ‘great deference’).”); cf. Steve R. 
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However, his description of some of the legislative history is 
misleading, as detailed below.109 
The amendment to what was then I.R.C. § 1141 was part of a 
failed attempt during a recodification of the Judicial Code to move 
the provisions governing the Tax Court from Title 26 to Title 28 of 
the U.S. Code.110 That attempt, which occurred in 1948, was motivated 
partly by the Dobson decision and partly by the enactment of the 
Administrative Procedure Act111 in 1946, the application of which to 
the Tax Court would have required significant changes in Tax Court 
procedure,112 most notably en banc review as a matter of right in any 
case decided by a single judge.113 
The 1948 bill passed the House of Representatives by a wide 
margin in spite of the opposition of many members of the House 
Ways & Means Committee, who did not want to relinquish 
jurisdiction over the Tax Court, as they would have had to if the Tax 
Court provisions had been moved to Title 28.114 The Senate held 
extensive hearings, and despite the fact that the bill revised and 
recodified all of Title 28, such that the Tax Court provisions 
constituted only a small part of the bill, the hearings primarily focused 
on whether nonattorneys would be allowed to practice before the Tax 
Court if it were made part of the judiciary.115 
The provision to make the Tax Court part of the federal judiciary 
was thus highly controversial in the Senate.116 It might have impeded 
passage of the bill and thereby stalled the recodification of Title 28. 
Representative Edward Devitt, appearing as a witness before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, advocated removing from the bill all of 
 
Johnson, The Phoenix and the Perils of the Second Best: Why Heightened Appellate Deference to 
Tax Court Decisions Is Undesirable, 77 OR. L. REV. 235, 252 (1998) (“It appears that ‘the Senate 
intended to overrule Dobson with respect to questions of fact only, while the House intended to 
overrule Dobson with respect to questions of fact as well as law.’” (quoting Shores, supra note 
25, at 652–53)); Smith, supra note 22, at 394 (“Certainly Shores is correct that Dobson’s rule 
relating to deferential review of Tax Court decisions survived the amendment of section 1141.”). 
 109. See infra notes 124–37 and accompanying text. 
 110. See Dubroff, supra note 9, at 22, 35–36; see also Rice, supra note 96, at 440 (“The 
amendment of Section 1141(a) was part of an act primarily designed to effectuate a long 
overdue revision of the Judicial Code.”). 
 111. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012). 
 112. Dubroff, supra note 9, at 26–27. 
 113. Shores, supra note 25, at 646. 
 114. Dubroff, supra note 9, at 31–32. 
 115. Id. at 35–36. 
 116. See Shores, supra note 25, at 648 (“When the Senate Judiciary Committee took up the 
House bill, opposition to the Tax Court provisions was intense . . . .”). 
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the language regarding the Tax Court except for the amendment 
relating to the Dobson rule. He argued that Dobson restricted the 
scope of review of Tax Court decisions, confused the law, and 
deterred tax attorneys from bringing cases to the Tax Court “because 
when they got up to the higher courts, they could not make a 
thorough-enough examination and review of the decision which had 
been rendered by the Tax Court.”117 
The chairman of the American Bar Association’s Section of 
Taxation, William Sutherland, similarly urged that whatever 
happened to the rest of the provisions regarding the Tax Court, the 
provision relating to appellate review should remain in the bill.118 He, 
too, argued that Dobson reflected a departure from the scope of 
review provided by statute: 
The present appellate review provisions in the Internal Revenue 
Code that govern appeals from the Tax Court were enacted in 1926, 
and gave the circuit courts of appeals what was assumed during all 
the period from 1926 to 1943, to be just as complete a power of 
review as the circuit courts of appeals exercised over cases coming 
from the district courts of the United States.119 
Ultimately, to secure passage of the bill, the Judiciary Committee 
removed all of the provisions regarding the Tax Court from the bill, 
except for one relating to the Dobson rule.120 However, the Senate bill 
amended only I.R.C. § 1141(a) (now § 7482(a)). As Professor Shores 
has pointed out, it left untouched the provision Justice Jackson 
quoted in Dobson, § 1141(c)—unlike the House bill, which would 
have replaced § 1141(c) with the new provision.121 The Senate version 
 
 117. Judicial Code and Judiciary: Hearings on H.R. 3214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 20 (1948) [hereinafter Judicial Code and Judiciary: 
Hearings] (statement of Rep. Devitt). 
 118. See id. at 169–71 (statement of W.A. Sutherland, Chairman, Tax Section, American Bar 
Association). 
 119. Id. at 167. Sutherland’s view is supported by the pre-Dobson Supreme Court case of 
Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937), for example, which stated in the context of 
determining whether a payment was compensation or an excludible gift:  
This, as we recently have pointed out, is “a conclusion of law or at least a 
determination of a mixed question of law and fact. It is to be distinguished from 
findings of primary, evidentiary or circumstantial facts. It is subject to judicial review 
and, on such review, the court may substitute its judgment for that of the board [of 
Tax Appeals].” 
Bogardus, 302 U.S. at 38–39 (quoting Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481, 491 (1937)). 
 120. Dubroff, supra note 9, at 36–37. 
 121. Shores, supra note 25, at 650–51. 
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passed both the House and the Senate,122 resulting in the situation that 
exists today, with both sets of language contained in what is now 
§ 7482.123  
Shores has argued that the reason the Senate bill retained the old 
language is because the Senate intended to repeal the Dobson rule 
only on questions of fact, whereas the House wanted to overturn 
Dobson on questions of law, as well.124 
However, the Senate’s description of Dobson characterizes the 
Dobson decision itself as referring to questions of fact. It wrote: 
The effect of [the] language [passed by the House] was to repeal the 
rule laid down in Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue to 
the effect that decisions of the Tax Court on questions of fact, 
including questions of accounting and ultimate conclusions of fact, 
are not reviewable if supported by any evidence in the record. The 
effect of section 1294 was to make decisions of the Tax Court on 
questions of fact reviewable if clearly erroneous, as is now the case 
with similar decisions of the district courts. In view of the 
elimination of the Tax Court from the bill and the consequent 
elimination of section 1294, this amendment to section 1141(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code is necessary in order to accomplish the 
result intended by section 1294.125 
This description by the Senate of Dobson and the House bill 
suggests that the Senate was trying to repeal Dobson where it thought 
 
 122. Dubroff, supra note 9, at 37. 
 123. See I.R.C. § 7482(a) (2012) (“The United States Courts of Appeals (other than the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to 
review the decisions of the Tax Court . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as 
decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury . . . .”); id. § 7482(c)(1) (“Upon 
such review, such courts shall have power to affirm or, if the decision of the Tax Court is not in 
accordance with law, to modify or to reverse the decision of the Tax Court, with or without 
remanding the case for a rehearing, as justice may require.”). 
  I.R.C. § 7482(c)(2), which provides that “[r]ules for review of decisions of the Tax 
Court shall be those prescribed by the Supreme Court under section 2072 of title 28 of the 
United States Code,” gives the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of practice and 
procedure for appeals of Tax Court decisions. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
address various aspects of filing a notice of appeal in Tax Court cases and other aspects of the 
record on appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 13. 
 124. See Shores, supra note 25, at 651 (“The [Senate] Committee’s explanation of its 
proposed amendment plainly states that it viewed section 1294 of the House bill as intended to 
repeal Dobson as applied to questions of fact. In light of that view, it made sense to retain 
section 1141(c). That provision, as construed in Dobson, would continue to govern review of 
questions of law, while the new provision of section 1141(a) would govern review of questions of 
fact.”). 
 125. S. REP. NO. 80-1559, at 13 (1948) (emphases added) (citation omitted). 
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Dobson applied, not specifically intending to preserve Dobson’s 
existence with respect to questions of law. Dobson had, of course, 
made important statements about the review of legal issues, as well, 
such as its statement that “[i]n deciding law questions courts may 
properly attach weight to the decision of points of law by an 
administrative body having special competence to deal with the 
subject matter.”126 But it does not appear that members of the House 
regarded the Senate version as materially different from the bill the 
House had passed: 
  Debate was limited when the bill was returned to the House. 
Representative Reed of Illinois was then in charge of the bill. He 
reported that Section 36 of the bill “removed all traces of the 
Dobson decision” in which “the Supreme Court created new rules as 
to the scope of review as to questions of law and fact” and presented 
a memorandum which embodied the views of the Judiciary 
Committee. The memorandum . . . observed that the Senate 
amendment “restores to the Circuit Courts of Appeals the power to 
review cases coming from the Tax Court in the same manner and to 
the same extent as it has power to review other cases—whether tax 
cases or non-tax cases—coming from a district court in a case tried 
without a jury. . . .”127 
Professor Shores rejects as implausible the notion that the Senate 
perceived Dobson as only involving the standard of review on factual 
issues, stating, “An alternative explanation is that the committee 
simply overlooked the existence of section 1141(c), or mistakenly 
assumed that Dobson dealt only with questions of fact. However, this 
explanation seems implausible in light of the extensive Senate 
hearings on the bill, and particularly in light of Mr. Sutherland’s 
submission.”128 Although initially it may seem surprising that the 
Senate would have less than a perfect understanding of Dobson, 
given the extensive testimony regarding that case, there are a couple 
of reasons why that is not implausible. First, the Dobson opinion was 
 
 126. Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943). The Dobson Court also said that the Tax 
Court’s “decision, of course, must have ‘warrant in the record’ and a reasonable basis in the law. 
But ‘the judicial function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the 
conclusions approved by the administrative body.’” Id. at 501 (quoting Rochester Tel. Corp. v. 
United States, 307 U.S. 125, 146 (1939)). Perhaps most famously, the Dobson Court stated that 
“when the court cannot separate the elements of a decision so as to identify a clear-cut mistake 
of law, the decision of the Tax Court must stand.” Id. at 502. 
 127. Rice, supra note 96, at 442 (footnote omitted) (quoting 94 CONG. REC. 8501 (1948) 
(statement of Rep. Chauncey Reed)). 
 128. Shores, supra note 25, at 651. 
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less than completely clear because it reflected a compromise among 
the views of different Justices.129 Second, and perhaps more 
important, the passage in which the Senate describes the House bill, 
quoted above and which Shores relies on, erroneously describes 
Dobson as limiting review on questions of fact only.130 While the 
Senate was aware that Dobson had caused problems, its written 
statements do not reflect awareness that Dobson had effected a shift 
from allowing reversal of a Tax Court decision that was “not in 
accordance with law” to requiring a “clear-cut mistake of law.”131 
Additionally, Sutherland’s submission did not say what Professor 
Shores reports that it said, as a comparison of Shores’s article and 
Sutherland’s testimony reveals. Shores describes Sutherland’s 
submission as follows: 
In his statement Mr. Sutherland discussed the distinction between 
questions of law and fact, and noted that under Dobson Tax Court 
decisions were final on all issues other than a “clear-cut question of 
law.” He did not address the standard of review applicable to clear-
cut questions of law. The main thrust of his criticism was that Dobson 
adopted an improper standard for distinguishing questions of fact 
from questions of law and that Tax Court decisions on questions of 
fact were final.132 
However, Sutherland did not focus on the law/fact distinction 
and did not argue that Tax Court decisions on factual issues were 
final. Instead, his statements, both oral and written, made two 
principal arguments: (1) before Dobson, review of Tax Court 
decisions was the same as review of district court decisions, and (2) 
the Supreme Court usurped legislative power when it decided 
Dobson.133 In Sutherland’s oral statement, he explained on the first 
point: 
 
 129. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 131. For a comparison of these two standards, see supra note 84 and accompanying text.  
 132. Shores, supra note 25, at 649–50 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citing Judicial 
Code and Judiciary: Hearings, supra note 117, at 171 (statement of W.A. Sutherland, Chairman, 
Tax Section, American Bar Association)). 
 133. In his written statement, he says on this point: 
  In our opinion the Dobson decision represents an utterly unwarranted invasion by 
the United States Supreme Court of the legislative field, and in addition, as legislation 
it is thoroughly unsound. When Congress acts to restore to taxpayers and to the 
Government the normal rights of review of Tax Court decisions, which existed prior 
to the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dobson case, it is our hope that the 
committee will see fit to call attention to the great damage and confusion which 
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  The present appellate review provisions in the Internal Revenue 
Code that govern appeals from the Tax Court were enacted in 1926, 
and gave the circuit courts of appeals what was assumed during all 
the period from 1926 to 1943, to be just as complete a power of 
review as the circuit courts of appeals exercised over cases coming 
from the district courts of the United States. 
  It was not thought, so far as I am aware, by any lawyer that there 
was any more limited review over those Tax Court cases than over 
any other cases coming up from district courts, and of course, a great 
many tax cases come up from district courts.134 
On the second point, he stated: 
  Now, Mr. Chairman, this is the chief reason why I was most 
anxious to have this matter cleared before your committee. It seems 
to me that the division of powers in this Government between the 
three branches and the respect for that division by each branch of 
the Government is essential to the preservation of this country in 
the way we want it. 
. . . . 
. . . [S]ometimes the Supreme Court itself steps beyond the bounds 
of its authority and usurps the function of the legislature. That is 
what was done in the Dobson decision. There is only one way that I 
know that the public attention can be called to action of the courts 
of the United States when they step clearly beyond their bounds and 
go into the policy matters which are clearly left by the Constitution 
for decision by Congress.135 
Sutherland did not mention the law/fact distinction at all in his 
oral statement.136 In his written statement, he referred to it in 
connection with the argument that Dobson disturbed the parallelism 
between appellate review of Tax Court and district court decisions: 
[U]ntil the Dobson decision in 1943, . . . [i]t was assumed by all the 
courts, including the Supreme Court, that, on appeal from the Tax 
Court, questions of law were fully reviewable and questions of fact 
 
always results from the invasion by the courts of the fields of policy which have been 
entrusted by the Constitution solely to the legislative branch of government. 
Judicial Code and Judiciary: Hearings, supra note 117, at 171 (statement of W.A. Sutherland, 
Chairman, Tax Section, American Bar Association). 
 134. Id. at 167. 
 135. Id. at 169. 
 136. See id. at 167–70. 
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were subject in general to the same sort of limited review that 
prevails on appeals from the United States district courts.137 
Thus, contrary to Shores’s argument, Sutherland did not say that 
Tax Court decisions on factual questions are or should be final, but 
rather that prior to Dobson they were understood to receive the 
“limited review” that findings of fact in district court decisions 
receive. In Sutherland’s written statement, he says, regarding the 
distinction between fact and law: 
  We are not unaware of the fact that there is frequently great 
difficulty in separating questions of law from questions of fact. But 
that is no excuse for the failure of the court to do so in cases coming 
from the Tax Court any more than in tax cases, or any other cases, 
coming from a district court. Nor is it any excuse that the question of 
law involved may be a question of what sort of accounting practice is 
acceptable under a given congressional tax statute. It is true that the 
traditional distinction between law and fact is sometimes illusory 
and not susceptible of any short and accurate definition, but at least 
the distinction is well established and is a distinction with which 
lawyers and judges generally have long been familiar. Wherever the 
line is drawn between law and fact there is no good reason why in all 
fairness both to the Government and private litigants it should be 
drawn in a different place in cases coming from the Tax Court than in 
cases coming from the district courts or why some other novel 
distinction should be set up for the court’s guidance.138 
Thus, Sutherland’s consistent position was that the Tax Court should 
be treated like the district courts for appellate review purposes, with 
the accompanying traditional distinction between factual and legal 
issues. 
 
 137. Id. at 171. The larger passage reads: 
Section 1141(c) of the Internal Revenue Code indicates that the circuit courts of 
appeals may reverse decisions of the Tax Court if they are “not in accordance with 
law.” From the time this appellate review was established by the 1926 Revenue Act 
until the Dobson decision in 1943, there was no suggestion that the review of Tax 
Court decisions was any more limited than the appellate review of the United States 
district courts. It would be accepted by everyone as clear that by this language 
Congress intended to provide in tax cases coming from the Tax Court as in those 
coming from district courts, the traditional review which turns on the well-known 
distinction between questions of law and questions of fact. It was assumed by all the 
courts, including the Supreme Court, that, on appeal from the Tax Court, questions of 
law were fully reviewable and questions of fact were subject in general to the same 
sort of limited review that prevails on appeals from the United States district courts. 
Id. 
 138. Id. at 172 (emphasis added). 
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Accordingly, to the extent that the legislative history sheds light 
on Congress’s actions in 1948, it suggests that the Senate intended to 
overrule Dobson in the sphere in which it understood Dobson to 
apply. The House expressed the view that the Senate amendment, 
which was enacted, overruled Dobson. Therefore, if the question of 
how to interpret § 1141 (now § 7482) were simply one of 
congressional intent, there would be a strong argument that Congress 
overruled Dobson in its entirety. 
Yet, the fact remains that the bill that Congress passed left 
subsection (c) untouched, raising the question of how the statutory 
language should be interpreted with respect to appellate review of 
issues of law. The failure to remove the old language did not seem to 
trouble commentators writing shortly after the amendment, who 
seemed to regard the Dobson rule as having been overturned.139 
Three years after the amendment, in 1951, Professor Ralph Rice 
explicitly raised the issue of what the retention of § 1141(c) meant, 
but he came out the same way as the other commentators. He first 
quoted the Judiciary Committee memorandum presented in the 
House, which stated that the Senate amendment restored parity 
between review of Tax Court and district court decisions.140 Rice then 
stated: 
Section 1141(c) of the Code was not amended. It gives appellate 
courts reviewing Tax Court decisions the power to reverse or modify 
if the decision below “is not in accordance with law.” Reconciliation 
 
 139. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 101, at 306 (“[H]owever unfortunate the method, the 
purpose of Congress [in amending section 1141(a)] was plain, and presumably accomplished. 
That purpose was to do away with the doctrine of the famous case of Dobson v. 
Commissioner.”); Robert M. Mangan, The Judicial Code of 1948, 37 GEO. L.J. 394, 401–02 
(1949) (“It was made amply clear that the purpose of this directive [on review of Tax Court 
decisions] was to reverse completely the rule of Dobson v. Commissioner . . . .”); Review—Tax 
Court Decisions, 24 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 609, 609 (1949) (“With the adoption of the recent 
amendment to Section 1141(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, Congress has freed the appellate 
courts from the ambiguous delimitation of the scope of review of Tax Court decisions laid down 
by the Supreme Court in Dobson v. Commissioner.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 613 (“There can 
be no question that the amendment has swept away the notion that review of Tax Court 
decisions must be predicated on finding a clear-cut mistake of law. Congress has made it clear 
that it desires a full review of the law.”); Alice Helen Sofis, Legislative Correction of the 
“Dobson” Rule, 10 U. PITT. L. REV. 83, 83 (1948) (“The amendment accomplishes the much 
needed correction of the effect of the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the Dobson 
case.”); see also Stark, supra note 50, at 243–44 (“Although there has been some recent 
scholarship suggesting that Congress may not have intended to repeal the Dobson rule, it seems 
clear that most lawyers at the time . . . believed that Dobson had been put to rest.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 140. Rice, supra note 96, at 442. 
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of this provision with the requirements of § 1141(a) might have been 
troublesome had not congressional intention with respect to the 
latter paragraph been made so explicit.141 
The following year, Justice Jackson lamented the “gelding” of 
Dobson in a dissenting opinion.142 His original draft of the dissent 
actually used the term “decapitation” to describe what Congress had 
done to Dobson; he changed it at the request of Justice Frankfurter, 
who suggested on a draft of the dissent, which he ultimately joined, 
that Justice Jackson use the term “‘demise,’ adding ‘or something. I 
don’t think “decapitation” is your pen at its best!’”143 Thus, even the 
architect of the Dobson opinion apparently believed Congress had 
felled the Dobson rule. And in 1955, Tax Court Judge Bolon Turner 
explained that the effect of the 1948 amendment was to create 
complete parity of review between the Tax Court and the district 
courts: 
When the situation . . . created by the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
the Dobson case was brought to the attention of Congress, it took 
such action as would make clear that no distinction was to be made 
between the decisions in the Tax Court and in the Federal District 
Courts, by amending Section [1141(a)] of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1939 . . . .144 
B. The Current Status of the Dobson Rule 
Of course, it is possible that these commentators were incorrect 
in believing that the 1948 amendment overruled Dobson. However, if 
Congress did not entirely overturn Dobson in 1948, then it effectively 
left to the judiciary the issue of what standard of review to apply to 
 
 141. Id. at 443 n.19. One appellate court, deciding a case soon after the statutory 
amendment, stated, “We think it clear, if there is a conflict, which we doubt, that the appellate 
power must be construed in conformance with the later enacted (a).” Gillette’s Estate v. 
Comm’r, 182 F.2d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 1950). This was dictum because, as Shores points out, the 
opinion finds no conflict between subsections (a) and (c) because it characterized the issue as 
one of fact. See Shores, supra note 25, at 654. However, it reflects another rationale for the 
notion that the congressional amendment eliminated the Dobson rule. 
 142. Arrowsmith v. Comm’r, 344 U.S. 6, 12 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 143. Barrett, supra note 73, at 130 (quoting Arrowsmith v. Comm’r, No. 51 (U.S. Nov. 7, 
1952) (Jackson, J., unpublished dissenting opinion)). 
 144. Bolon B. Turner, The Tax Court of the United States, Its Origin and Functions, in THE 
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF TAXATION 31, 45 (1955). 
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questions of law.145 That is, it was the Supreme Court that in 1943 
interpreted the courts of appeals’ right to reverse the Tax Court on 
questions of law as limited to “clear-cut mistake[s] of law,”146 and if 
Congress did not reverse that interpretation in 1948 (as argued 
above147), the Court could. 
Dobson has since been repudiated, even by the Supreme Court. 
For example, in 1974, Justice Douglas referred to Dobson as “short-
lived,”148 and in the 1991 case of Freytag v. Commissioner,149 the Court 
stated, 
The courts of appeals . . . review [Tax Court] decisions “in the same 
manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in 
civil actions tried without a jury.” This standard of review contrasts 
with the standard applied to agency rulemaking by the courts of 
appeals under § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act.150 
Moreover, an important element of the current status of Dobson 
is that the Tax Court is no longer an administrative agency, although 
it was one both at the time Dobson was decided and at the time of the 
statutory amendment. In 1969, Congress officially made the Tax 
Court a legislative court, taking it out of the executive branch.151 
 
 145. In fact, part of Shores’s argument is that “[a]t a minimum . . . the language and history 
of the 1948 amendment leave the door open for the courts to construe the amendment as 
limited to providing a new standard for review of factual issues.” Shores, supra note 25, at 653. 
 146. Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943). 
 147. See supra Part II.A. 
 148. See Comm’r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 19 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“Dobson . . . would have left picayune cases such as the present one largely to the Tax Court, 
whose expertise is well recognized. But Dobson was short-lived, as Congress made clear its 
purpose that we were to continue on our leaden-footed pursuit of law and justice in this field.”). 
 149. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991). Freytag addressed a challenge under the 
Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, to the Tax Court’s 
special trial judges. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 872. 
 150. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 891 (citations omitted) (quoting I.R.C. § 7482(a) (1988)) (citing 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)); see also Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40, 73 n.9 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting) (“Section 7482, which requires courts of appeals to review ‘decisions of the Tax 
Court’ in the same manner as they review similar district court decisions, was passed to 
eliminate any special deference paid to Tax Court decisions . . . .”); Flora v. United States, 362 
U.S. 145, 177 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Dobson v. Commissioner is no longer 
law . . . .” (citation omitted)); cf. Potter Stewart, Remarks at the Dedication of the New 
Courthouse of the United States Tax Court (Nov. 22, 1974), in 28 TAX LAW. 451, 453 (1974) 
(“Appropriate judicial restraint prevents me from taking this occasion to bemoan the passing of 
the doctrine of the Dobson case.”).  
 151. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 487, 730 (codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7441 (2012)). The Department of Justice argued in a 2013 brief filed with the D.C. Circuit that 
the statutory change in § 7441 “does not purport to transfer the Tax Court to another branch of 
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Additionally, in its 1991 Freytag decision, the Supreme Court held 
that the Tax Court is not a “Department” like Treasury,152 but rather 
is a “Court[] of Law” for the purposes of the Appointments Clause.153 
The Court stated, in part, that “[t]he Tax Court exercises judicial, 
rather than executive, legislative, or administrative, power.”154 
Because Dobson’s reasoning relied in part on the fact that the Tax 
Court was technically an administrative agency, it is not surprising 
that most courts and commentators believe that nothing of the 
Dobson rule remains. 
Accordingly, courts generally ignore § 7482(c)’s statement about 
decisions not in accordance with the law and focus on § 7482(a)’s 
admonition to treat Tax Court decisions the same as district court 
decisions for purposes of appellate review. However, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, it is possible to give effect to both 
subsections by reading § 7482(c) without the Dobson gloss. All that 
§ 7482(c) says with respect to court review is that “[u]pon such 
review, such courts shall have power to affirm or, if the decision of 
the Tax Court is not in accordance with law, to modify or to reverse 
the decision of the Tax Court, with or without remanding the case for 
a rehearing, as justice may require.”155 Thus, it explicitly grants the 
courts of appeals the power to reverse the Tax Court if its decision “is 
not in accordance with law,”156 and that does not seem to have been 
questioned before Dobson.157  
The implication from the fact that subsection (c) grants appellate 
courts broad power to affirm the Tax Court’s decisions but reserves 
reversals for decisions not in accordance with the law is that the 
courts of appeals originally were not authorized to reverse on 
 
government.” Brief for the Appellee at 61, Kuretski v. Comm’r, No. 13-1090 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 26, 
2013), 2013 WL 5400253, at *61. That may be because Congress made clear its intent in the 
legislative history, which states in part that the bill “ma[de] the Tax Court an Article I court 
rather than an executive agency,” S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 303 (1969), “establish[ing] the Tax 
Court as a court under Article I of the Constitution, dealing with the Legislative Branch.” Id. at 
304. The Senate explained that the Tax Court’s “constitutional status as an executive agency, no 
matter how independent, raises questions in the minds of some as to whether it is appropriate 
for one executive agency to be sitting in judgment on the determinations of another executive 
agency.” Id. at 302. The Supreme Court has since stated that the “Tax Court remains 
independent of the Executive and Legislative Branches.” Freytag, 501 U.S. at 891. 
 152. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 886–88. 
 153. Id. at 892. 
 154. Id. at 890–91. 
 155. I.R.C. § 7482(c)(1). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
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questions of fact. The legislative history supports the idea that such 
power was withheld for “reasons of policy” reflecting the then-
Board’s technical nature as an administrative agency.158 Thus, one 
might argue that § 7482(c) restricts appellate review of Tax Court 
decisions on findings of fact. However, Congress explicitly intended 
to eliminate that restriction when it enacted subsection (a), providing 
for appellate review on questions of fact concomitant with review of 
district court decisions, as everyone, including Professor Shores, 
agrees.159 Therefore, together the two subsections allow appellate 
review on questions of both law and fact. 
Moreover, § 7482(c) actually is silent on the details of the 
standard of review, even as to questions of law. In other words, does 
the appellate court take a de novo look to determine whether the 
decision is “not in accordance with law,” or does it apply some other 
standard? The legislative history of subsection (c) should not be 
dispositive because that section was enacted in 1926, well before the 
Board became a court. Section 7482(a) could be viewed as filling the 
gap as to the standard of review on the law.160 In addition, the 
subsequent legislation making the Tax Court officially a court of 
record supports that approach. 
C. Dobson’s Long Shadow 
Thus far, this Article has argued that the limitations on appellate 
review of Tax Court decisions can be traced to the Tax Court’s 
history as an administrative agency and that those limitations were 
later overturned by Congress. Congress likely accomplished parity 
with review of district court decisions in 1948, but if it did not, it left 
for judicial determination the standard of review of Tax Court 
decisions on questions of law. Since then, not only has the Tax Court 
 
 158. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  
 159. See Shores, supra note 25, at 653 (“At a minimum one can say that the language and 
history of the 1948 amendment leave the door open for the courts to construe the amendment as 
limited to providing a new standard for review of factual issues (‘clearly erroneous’) while 
retaining the Dobson standard for legal issues (entitled to ‘great deference’).”). 
 160. It is odd that subsection (a) is merely labeled “Jurisdiction,” given that subsection 
(a)(1) refers to the “manner” and “extent” of review, not just the exclusivity of appellate court 
jurisdiction. It appears to be a carryover from the 1926 statute, which included in the 
“Jurisdiction” section both the grant of appellate jurisdiction and the power of the appellate 
courts to affirm or reverse if the Board’s decision was not in accordance with the law. See 
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1003, 44 Stat. 9, 110. Regardless, a statute’s headers are not law. 
1A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 21:4 (7th ed. 2009).  
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been removed from the executive branch and made an Article I court, 
but the Supreme Court has generally also treated the Dobson rule as 
a matter of history rather than as a current precedent.161 Where does 
that leave review of Tax Court decisions? 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) governs the standard of 
review of findings of fact in district court bench trials; Rule 52(a)(6) 
states that “[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or other 
evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the 
reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity 
to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”162 The standard of review on legal 
issues appealed from the district courts is de novo.163 In general, these 
are the standards courts apply to Tax Court cases, as well.164 For 
example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted, “We 
review the legal rulings of the Tax Court de novo and its factual 
determinations for clear error,”165 further explaining, “[W]e owe no 
deference to the Tax Court’s statutory interpretations, its relationship 
to us being that of a district court to a court of appeals, not that of an 
administrative agency to a court of appeals.”166 
However, Dobson has cast a long shadow. For example, in 2011, 
without citing § 7482, a district court cited Dobson for the proposition 
that, “[w]hile decisions by the Tax Court are not binding, ‘uniform 
 
 161. See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.  
 162. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). The Supreme Court has stated: 
“[A] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed.” . . . If the district court’s account of the evidence 
is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not 
reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would 
have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the 
evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. 
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985) (citation omitted) (quoting 
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394–95 (1948)). 
 163. See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988) (“For purposes of standard of 
review, decisions by judges are traditionally divided into three categories, denominated 
questions of law (reviewable de novo), questions of fact (reviewable for clear error), and 
matters of discretion (reviewable for ‘abuse of discretion’).”). 
 164. 1 GERALD A. KAFKA & RITA A. CAVANAGH, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX 
CONTROVERSIES ¶ 11.13[3] (2d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2013); see also Rose v. Comm’r, 311 F. App’x 
196, 200 n.8 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The Tax Court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, and 
its resolutions of questions of law . . . are reviewed de novo.”). 
 165. Schneidelman v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 2012). The court quoted for this 
proposition 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1), which says that “[t]he United States Court of 
Appeals . . . shall . . . review the decisions of the Tax Court . . . in the same manner and to the 
same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.” 
 166. Id. (quoting Madison Recycling Assocs. v. Comm’r, 295 F.3d 280, 285 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
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administration would be promoted by conforming to them where 
possible.’”167 And it took until 2013 for the Second Circuit to hold that 
§ 7482(a) requires it to apply the same standard of review to mixed 
questions of law and fact decided by the Tax Court as it does to 
district court decisions.168 
In the 2013 case of Diebold Foundation, Inc. v. Commissioner,169 
the Second Circuit explained that, in a 1991 case, it had adopted the 
“clear error” standard used by the Seventh Circuit in reviewing mixed 
questions of law and fact decided by the Tax Court.170 However, 
unlike the Seventh Circuit, which applied the same standard to 
district court decisions, the Second Circuit’s standard of review of 
district court cases involving mixed questions of law and fact hinged 
on whether the alleged error dealt with the legal or factual aspect of 
the mixed question.171 The Second Circuit had apparently overlooked 
§ 7482 in rendering the 1991 decision.172 
Other examples may be more subtle. Professor Steve Johnson 
has observed that “boilerplate language in appellate court opinions as 
 
 167. Cummings v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 2d 42, 47 n.11 (D. Mass. 2011) (quoting 
Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943)). In addition, in 1991, a court of appeals stated, 
“Because ‘in the circumstances of this case, [the] proper adjustment of the basis was . . . purely 
an accounting problem and therefore a question of fact for the Tax Court to determine,’ we 
defer to the tax court.” Muserlian v. Comm’r, 932 F.2d 109, 115–16 (2d Cir. 1991) (alterations in 
original) (quoting Dobson, 320 U.S. at 504).  
 168. Diebold Found., Inc. v. Comm’r, 736 F.3d 172, 183 (2d Cir. 2013). Mixed questions of 
law and fact are “questions in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of 
law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard.” Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982). The Supreme Court has “held that deferential 
review of mixed questions of law and fact is warranted when it appears that the district court is 
‘better positioned’ than the appellate court to decide the issue in question or that probing 
appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine.” Salve Regina Coll. v. 
Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). More 
recently, the Court held that “deferential” review applies when “‘the mix weighs heavily on the 
fact side.’” Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1932 (2011) (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 
148 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment)) (quotation marks omitted). 
 169. Diebold Found., Inc. v. Comm’r, 736 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 170. Id. (citing Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Comm’r, 933 F.2d 1084, 1088 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 171. See id. at 182 (“Following a civil bench trial, . . . resolutions of mixed questions of fact 
and law are reviewed de novo to the extent that the alleged error is based on the 
misunderstanding of a legal standard, and for clear error to the extent that the alleged error is 
based on a factual determination.”). 
 172. See id. at 183 (explaining that the Second Circuit had stated, when it adopted the 
standard, that it was unaware of a decision governing its standard of review of Tax Court 
decisions and that that was correct, “but the statute which governs our Court’s review of Tax 
Court decisions set out a mandatory standard, tied to the level of review in appeals on review 
from a district court”). 
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to the standard of review may not describe the true behavior of those 
courts. Heightened deference to the Tax Court may operate as 
‘Dobson sub silencio.’”173 That may be the case if a court relies on 
Dobson’s reasoning, or cases reflecting that reasoning, without 
actually citing Dobson. 
For example, in 2012, the Ninth Circuit recited the de novo 
review standard for Tax Court conclusions of law, then stated, 
“[a]lthough we do not give the Tax Court special deference in a de 
novo review, ‘[b]ecause the Tax Court has special expertise in the 
field, . . . its opinions bearing on the Internal Revenue Code are 
entitled to respect.’”174 The opinion quotes a 1999 Ninth Circuit case, 
the language of which traces back175 to a 1979 case and a 1980 case.176 
The 1979 case, Allstate Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Commissioner,177 
 
 173. Johnson, supra note 108, at 252. 
 174. Meruelo v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (second and third alterations in 
original) (quoting Merkel v. Comm’r, 192 F.3d 844, 847–48 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 175. See Merkel, 192 F.3d at 847–48 (stating that it reviews the Tax Court’s conclusions of 
law de novo but that “[b]ecause the Tax Court has special expertise in the field, however, its 
opinions bearing on the Internal Revenue Code are ‘entitled to respect’” (quoting Harbor 
Bancorp & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 115 F.3d 722, 727 (9th Cir. 1997))); Harbor Bancorp, 115 
F.3d at 727 (stating that it reviews de novo “the legal standards the court applied in reaching its 
conclusions,” but that “[a]t the same time, ‘the Commissioner has latitude in the interpretation 
of the Internal Revenue Code . . . and . . . the Tax Court’s opinions bearing on the Internal 
Revenue Code are entitled to respect because of its special expertise in the field’” (second and 
third alterations in original) (quoting Take v. Comm’r, 804 F.2d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1986))); Take, 
804 F.2d at 556 (stating that Tax Court decisions on the “ruling[s] of law” are “subject to de 
novo review” but that “the Tax Court’s opinions bearing on the Internal Revenue Code are 
entitled to respect because of its special expertise in the field” (citing Magneson v. Comm’r, 753 
F.2d 1490, 1493 (9th Cir. 1985))); Magneson, 753 F.2d at 1493 (“We review the Tax Court’s 
conclusions of law de novo, noting however that its opinions are entitled to respect because of 
its special expertise in the field.” (citing Cal. Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 680 F.2d 85, 87 (9th 
Cir. 1982))); Cal. Fed., 680 F.2d at 87 (“[T]he interpretation of the Tax Court is entitled to 
respect because of its special expertise in the field.” (citing Cruttenden v. Comm’r, 644 F.2d 
1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1981) and Allstate Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Comm’r, 600 F.2d 760, 762 (9th Cir. 
1979))).  
 176. Sibla v. Comm’r, 611 F.2d 1260, 1262 (9th Cir. 1980); Allstate, 600 F.2d at 762. In 
Cruttenden v. Commissioner, 644 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth Circuit stated, “This court 
has frequently recognized its obligation to accord respect to the views of the Tax Court. 
‘Opinions of the Tax Court reflect that degree of special expertise which Congress has intended 
to provide in that tribunal.’” Id. at 1374 (quoting Max Sobel Wholesale Liquors v. 
Commissioner, 630 F.2d 670, 674 (9th Cir. 1980), which itself was quoting Sibla, 611 F.2d at 
1262). Cruttenden further stated, “[W]e ‘should not overrule that body unless some 
unmistakable question of law mandates such a decision.’” Id. (quoting Max Sobel, 630 F.2d at 
674).  
 177. Allstate Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Comm’r, 600 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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involved the treatment of selling expenses of foreclosed property.178 In 
Allstate, the Ninth Circuit said, 
This case presents precisely the type of issues with respect to which 
we should accord substantial deference to the Tax Court. The 
resolution of such technical issues affecting a single industry is a task 
for which the Tax Court is well suited. For this reason alone we 
would be reluctant to overturn the Tax Court’s judgment.179 
None of the cases in this line cited Dobson, but the 1980 case, 
Sibla v. Commissioner,180 quoted the Supreme Court’s 1943 decision in 
Commissioner v. Heininger,181 stating: 
[W]e consider that the tax court has exercised that degree of special 
expertise which Congress has intended to provide in that tribunal, 
and that this court should not overrule that body, unless some 
unmistakable question of law mandates such a decision. As the 
Supreme Court said in Commissioner v. Heininger: 
  “Whether an expenditure is directly related to a business and 
whether it is ordinary and necessary are doubtless pure questions of 
fact in most instances. Except where a question of law is 
unmistakably involved a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals on 
these issues, having taken into account the presumption supporting 
the Commissioner’s ruling . . . , should not be reversed by the federal 
appellate courts . . . . Careful adherence to this principle will result 
in a more orderly and uniform system of tax deductions in a field 
necessarily beset by innumerable complexities.”182  
Heininger was decided by the Supreme Court on the same day as 
Dobson.183 The issue in Heininger was whether expenditures to defend 
against a finding by the Postmaster General that the taxpayer’s mail-
order business was fraudulent were “ordinary and necessary” 
expenses within the meaning of the statute allowing business 
deductions.184 Heininger concluded with the Dobson-esque language 
quoted just above. The second sentence in the quoted material was 
 
 178. Id. at 761–62. 
 179. Id. at 762 (emphasis added). 
 180. Sibla v. Comm’r, 611 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 181. Comm’r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943). 
 182. Sibla, 611 F.2d at 1262–63 (citation omitted) (quoting Heininger, 320 U.S. at 475).  
 183. Both were decided on December 20, 1943. See Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 489 
(1943); Heininger, 320 U.S. at 467. 
 184. Heininger, 320 U.S. at 468–70. 
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supported with a footnote citing to Dobson and an earlier case.185 
Heininger therefore not only reflects the Dobson concept of limiting 
appellate review in tax cases to foster uniformity in a complex field, 
but it also cites Dobson as authority on that policy goal. 
In addition, Heininger is much like Dobson in that it 
characterized a tax issue as purely factual, without providing an 
explanation for that determination or setting forth a standard for 
distinguishing factual questions from questions of law and mixed 
questions. The question of whether an expenditure was an “ordinary 
and necessary” business expense, much like the tax-benefit-rule issue 
in Dobson, would seem to have substantial legal elements. But the 
Dobson approach of declaring an issue factual in nature was a means 
to the end of reducing appellate review in an effort to curtail tax 
litigation.186 
In some ways, Heininger deserves more criticism than Dobson 
because the Heininger Court called for the same deferential standard 
of review yet did not require the Board’s opinion to stand. Instead, 
the Court found that the Board had denied the taxpayer’s deduction 
“not by an independent exercise of judgment but upon a mistaken 
conviction that denial was required as a matter of law.”187 The Court 
therefore affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s reversal and remand of the 
Board’s decision.188 
If we take the Heininger Court at its word that “[e]xcept where a 
question of law is unmistakably involved a decision of the Board of 
Tax Appeals on these issues . . . should not be reversed by the federal 
appellate courts,”189 then the Court’s finding that the issue in 
Heininger was one of fact constituted dictum.190 It appears that it was 
 
 185. Id. at 475 & n.13 (citing Dobson, 320 U.S. at 489; Helvering v. Lazarus & Co, 308 U.S. 
252, 255 (1939)). 
 186. See supra Part I.B.  
 187. Heininger, 320 U.S. at 475. The Board had stated, “After careful consideration of this 
somewhat novel question we have come to the conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled to 
the deduction claimed. National Outdoor Advertising Bureau v. Helvering, in our opinion 
governs this case.” Heininger v. Comm’r, 47 B.T.A. 95, 101 (1942) (citation omitted) (citing 
Nat’l Outdoor Adver. Bureau v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878 (1937)), rev’d, 133 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 
1943), aff’d, 320 U.S. 467. That case had reversed the Board, allowing the expenses in a “civil 
proceeding involving [an] injunction against [a] practice forbidden by law” only to the extent the 
defense was successful. Id. at 102.  
 188. Heininger, 320 U.S. at 475.  
 189. Id. 
 190. Cf. Rice, supra note 96, at 446 n.41 (stating that in some cases “the Court declared that 
the Dobson decision was not controlling and passed upon the issues raised on appeal” and citing 
Heininger as one of those cases). 
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an attempt to square the decision with Dobson. As Randolph Paul 
explained, “Having decided the issue involved, the Court apparently 
felt that it should say something about the respective functions of the 
Tax Court and the appellate courts. Perhaps it thought that the 
Dobson opinion might appear at odds with what the Court had just 
done in the Heininger case.”191 
Given that context, as well as the demise of the Dobson 
approach to tax litigation, Heininger provides highly suspect support 
for the proposition that whether a purported business expense was 
ordinary and necessary is normally a “pure question[] of fact.”192 
Instead, Heininger should be considered as closely linked to Dobson 
and thus a questionable authority to cite on issues of standard of 
review. Yet, not only was its reasoning perpetuated in the Ninth 
Circuit cases discussed above, but also, in 2011, the Tax Court cited 
Heininger for the proposition that whether an expenditure constitutes 
a deductible business expense is a factual question.193 In 2012, the 
Second Circuit did the same.194 
In the Second Circuit case, Curcio v. Commissioner,195 the 
taxpayers owned small businesses that purchased life insurance plans 
on their behalf and claimed the costs as deductible business 
expenses.196 On appeal, the Second Circuit recited the conventional 
standard of review, stating that “[w]e review the tax court’s legal 
conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.”197 
However, it then relied heavily on Heininger to find that whether a 
purported business expense is “ordinary and necessary” is a purely 
factual question requiring deference to the Tax Court.198 
As the Second Circuit’s experience reveals, retreat from 
Dobson—and its thumb on the scale in favor of finding issues to be 
questions of fact warranting great deference—can be a long, slow 
path. The courts of appeals must not merely apply § 7482(a); rather, 
 
 191. Paul, supra note 82, at 790. 
 192. See id. (noting that that whether something is a business expense is a “pure question[] 
of fact . . . [unless] a question of law is unmistakably involved”). 
 193. See Weller v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 260, 263 (2011) (citing Heininger for the 
proposition that “[t]he determination of whether an expenditure satisfies the requirements for 
deductibility under section 162 is a question of fact”). 
 194. See Curcio v. Comm’r, 689 F.3d 217, 225 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 195. Curcio v. Comm’r, 689 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 196. Id. at 219. 
 197. Id. at 225 (citing Robinson Knife Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 600 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
 198. Id. (citing Comm’r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943)). 
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they also need to recognize that Dobson is not good law and that 
cases applying Dobson’s sweeping approach to what constitutes a 
factual question are highly suspect.199 That is, courts should not apply 
Heininger on the question of whether an issue is one of fact or law 
without considering Heininger’s close ties to the disavowed Dobson 
case.200 
III.  A POLICY PERSPECTIVE ON APPELLATE REVIEW OF TAX 
COURT DECISIONS 
The history of appellate review of Tax Court decisions suggests 
that, at least as a doctrinal matter, Tax Court decisions should be 
treated the way district court decisions in nonjury tax cases are. But 
policy considerations are of course equally important. This Part 
therefore addresses the role of appellate review of trial court 
decisions and whether the traditional approach to that review should 
be different in the Tax Court context. 
A. General Appellate Review Theory 
The very existence of appellate courts suggests that Congress 
does not view trial courts as necessarily having the last word in the 
cases before them.201 And a litigant’s right to appellate review is 
generally considered to be a core component of the litigation 
 
 199. Cf. Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 n.11 (1960) (stating that Dobson is no 
longer good law on the standard of review, but citing Heininger with approval on the question of 
what constitutes a factual issue). One student note has cited Duberstein in a critical manner for 
the proposition that despite Congress’s overruling of Dobson, “the Court has since returned to 
narrow review, at least in the gift area.” Note, Toward New Modes of Tax Decisionmaking—
The Debt-Equity Imbroglio and Dislocations in Tax Lawmaking Responsibility, 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 1695, 1700 n.36 (1970). 
 200. Recall that the Dobson Court held that “[t]he error of the court below consisted of 
treating as a rule of law what we think is only a question of proper tax accounting.” Dobson v. 
Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 506–07 (1943). What is “tax accounting”? A contemporary commentator 
reported, “The term had its origin and development in commerce schools. Every such school in 
the country has for years had a course under that precise title. Those courses, however, in every 
case cover the entire field of income tax law.” Altman, supra note 16, at 543. 
 201. See Robert L. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A 
Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 113 (1944) (“[T]he fact that Congress has vested in 
the trier original jurisdiction to hear a case does not manifest an intention that his determination 
be final. To the contrary, the creation of appellate courts with full power to review in itself 
reflects a strong policy that litigants should not be bound by the ruling of the subordinate 
tribunal.”). 
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process.202 An important purpose of appellate review is the correction 
of trial court error.203 Appellate review also promotes uniformity of 
decisions and the development of a body of precedent.204 
Given these goals of appellate review, the allocation of duties 
between trial and appellate courts reflects what are considered to be 
their comparative institutional competencies.205 As the Supreme 
Court has explained, trials are fast paced, presided over by a single 
judge, and necessarily focused on gathering the evidence.206 By 
contrast, courts of appeals benefit from a factual record settled by the 
court below and thus have more time to focus on issues of law,207 as do 
 
 202. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 144 (1994) (referring to appellate courts as the “central 
component of the adjudicative process”); Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not To Defer: A Study of 
Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. REV. 899, 
910 (1989) (“It is generally accepted that ‘[t]he right of appeal, while never held to be within the 
Due Process guaranty of the United States Constitution, is a fundamental element of procedural 
fairness . . . in this country.’” (alteration in original) (quoting AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON 
STANDARDS OF JUD. ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS 12 (1977))); 
Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right To Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1224 (2013) 
(“Appellate remedies play a significant role in the American justice system.”). 
  The right to appeal may be particularly important in cases in which the government is a 
party. See Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right To Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE 
L.J. 62, 103 (1985) (“A sound argument can be made that even in civil cases, litigants who find 
themselves tilting against the overwhelming might of the state, in a forum set up and operated 
by the state, should have the right to a sober second look.”). 
 203. See Coenen, supra note 202, at 939 (“It often is said that the purposes of appellate 
review are to correct errors and to create and clarify a body of law.”); Robertson, supra note 
202, at 1225 (listing “correcting legal and factual errors” as among the roles of appellate review 
identified by scholars).  
 204. See Robertson, supra note 202, at 1225. 
 205. See Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the 
Appellate Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 940 (2011) (“The trial court, 
which hears the witnesses and makes the record, is assumed to have superior competence to 
resolve questions of fact; the reviewing court is presumed to have superior competence to 
resolve questions of law.”); see also Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Common Law 
Toolbox for Enhancing Court-Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2242869 (“Under the appellate model, 
review is record-bound in that the reviewing court does not take evidence itself, and the 
standard of review is less or more deferential depending on whether the issue is more legal or 
factual—reflecting the expertise or competency of the different institutions.”). 
 206. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1991) (“District judges preside 
alone over fast-paced trials: Of necessity they devote much of their energy and resources to 
hearing witnesses and reviewing evidence.”). Even the litigants are likely less focused on the law 
at that stage than they would be on appeal. See id. (“[T]he logistical burdens of trial advocacy 
limit the extent to which trial counsel is able to supplement the district judge’s legal research 
with memoranda and briefs.”). 
 207. See id. at 232 (“With the record having been constructed below and settled for purposes 
of the appeal, appellate judges are able to devote their primary attention to legal issues.”).  
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the parties’ attorneys.208 Accordingly, the standard of review of a trial 
court’s decision on legal issues is typically de novo,209 which supports a 
meaningful appeal right.210 
Moreover, appellate review helps legitimize the litigation process 
in the public’s eyes.211 Trials usually are presided over by a single 
judge,212 who may bear the brunt of the losing party’s dissatisfaction 
with the outcome of the case.213 “With or without justification, losing 
litigants often view [the trial] judge as inept, biased, or corrupt.”214 In 
effect, the focus of the dispute shifts, after the trial court’s decision, 
from the opposing party to the trial judge.215 An appeal gives the 
losing party a chance to vet that judge’s determination.216 This 
structural setup 
serves to defuse antagonism directed at the trial judge by affording a 
fair hearing, both in fact and in appearance, to litigants who believe 
that judge has wronged them. By thus legitimizing lower court 
proceedings, the appellate process fulfills a central aim of the law—
to “preserve both the appearance and reality of fairness, generating 
the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has 
been done.”217 
 
 208. See id. (“As questions of law become the focus of appellate review, it can be expected 
that the parties’ briefs will be refined to bring to bear on the legal issues more information and 
more comprehensive analysis than was provided for the district judge.”). 
 209. See Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 308 
(2009) (relating that law students learn early on that “every time an appellate court reviews a 
legal determination made by a trial court, it considers the question anew, and accords no 
deference to the lower court’s decision”). 
 210. See Robertson, supra note 202, at 1252–54 (discussing civil cases in which the Supreme 
Court required de novo, rather than abuse-of-discretion, review).  
 211. See id. at 1225 (listing among the roles of appellate review “promoting respect for the 
rule of law”).  
 212. Salve Regina Coll., 499 U.S. at 231.  
 213. See Coenen, supra note 202, at 939 (“Litigants who lose at trial focus their antipathy on 
the trial judge.”). 
 214. Id. 
 215. See Robertson, supra note 202, at 1273 (“[A]t the trial court, the litigant’s dispute is 
with the opposing party, and at the appellate level the litigant’s dispute is with the state.”). 
 216. See Coenen, supra note 202, at 940; see also Robertson, supra note 202, at 1263 (“The 
existence of appellate review serves as a check on both the perception and the reality of biased 
or corrupt judging.”). 
 217. Coenen, supra note 202, at 939–40 (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 
(1980)) (quotation marks omitted).  
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This “legitimating function”218 of appellate review is therefore an 
important process value. 
In addition, appellate courts enjoy the structural advantage of 
“multijudge panels that permit reflective dialogue and collective 
judgment.”219 In part, the use of panels means that each judge on a 
case benefits from the others’ questions and insights.220 Multiplying 
judicial attention to the issues should reduce the likelihood of 
errors.221 Moreover, “a central function of multi-judge review is to 
control judicial subjectivity.”222 Equally important, the presence of 
multiple judges helps neutralize a losing litigant’s potential lack of 
confidence in a single judge.223 Deference to a trial court’s 
determination typically undermines the value of a multi-judge panel 
because it “fosters acceptance of a single judge’s point of view. As a 
result, the rule clashes with a central message of modern legal 
scholarship.”224  
Thus, the appellate model of judicial review reflects both the 
importance of a second look at the case and the structural differences 
between a trial court that hears the evidence and an appellate court 
that reviews the record after trial. The model supports, based on 
relative institutional competencies, allocation of fact-finding to trial 
 
 218. Id. at 939. 
 219. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991) (citation omitted). In addition, 
“appellate judges have more prestige than trial judges.” Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz, 
“A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason”: Toward Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 
1773, 1777 n.14 (1993). Article III judges are also generally considered to have more prestige 
than Article I judges, perhaps because only the former have life tenure. See Lawrence Baum, 
Specializing the Federal Courts: Neutral Reforms or Efforts To Shape Judicial Policy?, 74 
JUDICATURE 217, 219 (1991) (“Another difference, among the courts with permanent judges, is 
that between Article I ‘legislative’ courts and Article III courts; the latter have greater prestige, 
and their judges hold lifetime terms.”). This should mean that some of the most highly respected 
judges populate the courts of appeals. 
 220. See Coenen, supra note 202, at 924 (“Assigning several judges to a problem reduces the 
risk that important lines of analysis will escape attention. Each judge benefits from the others’ 
insights, including their questions of counsel at oral argument.” (footnote omitted)). 
 221. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 
83 (1986) (“[G]iven a reasonable understanding of what the job of judging is and under 
reasonable assumptions about how well individual judges are likely to do it, enlarging the 
number of judges who sit on a court can be expected to improve the court’s performance.”). 
 222. Coenen, supra note 202, at 945; see id. (“A multi-judge appellate process, although 
subjective, is at least carefully subjective.”). 
 223. Robertson, supra note 202, at 1263. 
 224. Coenen, supra note 202, at 945–46; see id. (making that argument in the context of 
appellate court deference to district courts on questions of state law). 
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courts and allocation of lawmaking to appellate courts.225 Deference 
to a trial court’s legal conclusions clashes with all of these reasons for 
appellate review and might “adversely affect the perceived legitimacy 
of the judicial system.”226 
B. Differences in Tax Litigation That May Affect the Analysis 
The appellate review model is well accepted in the case of 
generalized trial courts such as federal district courts. One of the odd 
aspects of arguments (such as Professor Shores’s) for deference to 
Tax Court decisions is that they argue primarily for deference on 
issues of law, not fact. From the perspective of general litigation, that 
seems almost backward. Appellate courts generally defer to trial 
courts with respect to the facts, not the law.227 The idea behind that 
deference is that the trier of fact is better equipped to find the facts 
because of its observation of the witnesses and the like.228 
Is there any reason to give the Tax Court essentially the last 
word on issues of law? Professor Shores has argued that Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.229 supports such 
deference,230 although he concedes that “[i]t would be a stretch to 
claim that review of Tax Court decisions falls within the four corners 
of Chevron. Chevron involved a classic administrative agency, the 
EPA, with rulemaking as well as adjudicative powers.”231 The Tax 
 
 225. See KOMESAR, supra note 202, at 124 (“Appellate courts articulate the rules that most 
people consider judge-made law.”). 
 226. Oldfather, supra note 209, at 362; see id. at 364 (noting this objection to an argument 
for a nonabsolute form of deference that “does not preclude a determination that a trial court 
got the law wrong”). 
 227. Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal 
Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 438 (2004). The standard of review on facts generally is 
“clearly erroneous.” See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. 
 228. Oldfather, supra note 227, at 438–39. Even that apparent institutional advantage has 
been questioned, however. See id. at 439 (“There are, it turns out, many respects in which 
appellate courts enjoy substantial advantages over trial judges and juries when it comes to the 
evaluation of historical facts.”). 
 229. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 230. See Shores, supra note 25, at 669 (“[T]he question becomes, whereas, under Chevron 
deferential review would apply if the Tax Court had remained within the Service, does it make 
sense to apply de novo review to Tax Court decisions because the Tax Court operates 
independently of the Service. With the question put that way, the answer, of course, is 
obvious.”). 
 231. Id.  
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Court, by contrast, is a court and only has judicial functions.232 
Professor Johnson has pointed out that Chevron does not apply to 
non-agencies, such as the Tax Court.233 He has further argued that 
policy considerations do not support extending Chevron to the Tax 
Court.234 Although scholars have debated the rationales for court 
deference to agency interpretations,235 the leading candidates—
congressional delegation, separation-of-powers concerns, and the 
executive branch’s greater accountability—do not support deference 
to the Tax Court.236 
 
 232. See I.R.C. § 7441 (2012) (establishing the Tax Court “under article I of the Constitution 
of the United States, [as] a court of record”); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991) (“The 
Tax Court exercises judicial power to the exclusion of any other function. It is neither advocate 
nor rulemaker.”). 
 233. See Johnson, supra note 108, at 280 (“Taken literally, Chevron talks about courts 
deferring to administrative agencies, not courts deferring to other courts. Whatever its origins, 
the Tax Court is now, and for almost 30 years has been, a court. The Administrative Procedure 
Act distinguishes between courts on the one hand and agencies on the other, and I suspect that 
tribunals applying Chevron in the future will take the same approach.” (footnote omitted)); see 
also Smith, supra note 22, at 393 (“While it is tempting to use a Chevron-type rationale for 
deference to the Tax Court—when dealing with an administrative law like tax—it is 
incompatible with the Tax Court’s Article I position.”). But see Andre L. Smith, Deferential 
Review of the United States Tax Court, After Mayo Foundation v. United States (2011), at 8 
(2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/andre_smith/18 
(“Applying Chevron to the Tax Court is congruent with its application to other federal 
administrative contexts—Chevron deference applies both to notice and comment rulemakings 
and to formal adjudications.”). 
 234. See Johnson, supra note 108, at 283–84. Professor Johnson further argues that history 
and doctrine do not support applying Chevron to the Tax Court. Id. at 280–82. 
 235. See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1273 (2008) 
(“Scholars have debated whether Chevron deference rests upon a theory of congressional 
delegation, administrative expertise, agency deliberative rationality, the executive branch’s 
political responsiveness and accountability, concerns for national regulatory uniformity, or 
inherent executive power.”); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 
GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (“Three candidates [for Chevron deference] have been put forward in 
the legal literature: (1) the Constitution, in the form of the doctrine of separation of powers; (2) 
the courts, in the form of a common-law norm of self-governance; and (3) the Congress, in the 
form of a presumption about congressional intent.”). 
 236. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial 
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1538 (2006) (“[United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 
(2001),] makes clear that Chevron deference is warranted only for agency interpretations 
promulgated through the exercise of congressionally delegated authority to bind regulated 
parties with the force of law.”); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 273, 275 (2011) (arguing that “the foundation for the Chevron doctrine is anchored in the 
separation of powers as manifested by the structure of the Constitution and Article III’s 
assignment of the judicial powers”); Smith, supra note 22, at 393 (“Part of the underlying 
rationale for deferring to agency interpretations under Chevron is that the agency is politically 
accountable to the President who is accountable to the people. The Tax Court . . . is designed to 
be much less politically accountable since it is situated in the Legislative, not the Executive 
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The remaining question is therefore whether the appellate 
review structure that applies to other courts should not apply to the 
Tax Court because of differences in the Tax Court or in tax litigation 
more generally. The principal arguments in favor of applying greater 
deference to Tax Court decisions than to other trial courts’ decisions, 
which have not changed much since the Dobson era—Tax Court 
judges’ specialized expertise, the decentralized nature of tax 
litigation, and the arguably exceptional nature of tax law—are 
therefore considered below. 
1. The Specialized Expertise of Tax Court Judges.  Perhaps most 
important to advocates of deference, the Tax Court is specialized—its 
judges only decide tax cases237—and accordingly has greater expertise 
in tax matters than do other courts.238 Of course, because the 
overwhelming majority of Tax Court cases are decided by one 
judge,239 the relative expertise of the Tax Court versus a court of 
appeals in any given case will depend on that judge’s practice 
background and experience at the Tax Court. Tax is a broad area, and 
no judge will have prior experience in every issue. On average, 
though, a Tax Court judge has greater tax expertise than a court of 
 
Branch.” (footnote omitted)); see also Johnson, supra note 108, at 282 (pointing out that 
Congress delegated gap-filling authority in the tax arena to Treasury, not the Tax Court); id. at 
283 (“Treasury and the IRS are designed to be, and are, more politically accountable than is the 
Tax Court.”). It is also worth noting that Congress chose to move the Tax Court out of the 
executive branch and into the legislative branch. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
Further discussion of this interesting issue (and the potential applicability of Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)) is beyond the scope of this Article.  
 237. Crimm, supra note 3, at 74. 
 238. See id. (“[T]he Presidentially appointed judges and the special trial judges [of the Tax 
Court] have tax expertise acquired both before appointment or assignment to the court and, 
obviously, during their terms on the court.”); Johnson, supra note 108, at 259 (“[A] principal 
rationale for deference is the belief that the Tax Court is more qualified to render sound 
decisions in tax cases than are other courts.”). 
 239. See I.R.C. § 7444(c) (2012) (“The chief judge may from time to time divide the Tax 
Court into divisions of one or more judges . . . .”); Dubroff, supra note 9, at 227–29 (describing 
how the Tax Court came to be divided into divisions that are each comprised of one judge). 
Typically, the report of a (single-judge) division becomes final. See I.R.C. § 7460(b) (“The 
report of the division shall become the report of the Tax Court within 30 days after such report 
by the division, unless within such period the chief judge has directed that such report shall be 
reviewed by the Tax Court.”). Only approximately 1 percent of the Tax Court’s opinions are 
reviewed by the full court and thus issued by more than one judge. For example, statistics 
obtained from the Tax Court show that in 2010, 7 of its 684 opinions were reviewed by the full 
court; in 2011, 5 of its 673 opinions were reviewed by the court; and in 2012, 7 of its 663 opinions 
were so reviewed. TAX COURT STATISTICS, FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 6 tbl.6 (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal).  
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appeals judge, as the Tax Court hears more tax cases than does any 
other federal court.240 
The possible advantages of expertise and specialization for 
efficient and high-quality decisionmaking may be obvious.241 
However, that does not necessarily mean that appellate courts should 
defer to a trial court that has that specialized expertise. Even 
Professor Chad Oldfather, who has argued for a form of deferential 
review that would allow a court to choose not to apply de novo 
review in some cases,242 points out that it would be controversial and 
“potentially dangerous”243 to “allow courts to decline to decide 
questions of law where they perceive themselves to be at a 
competency disadvantage (e.g., ‘we don’t know much about tax 
law’).”244 The risk Oldfather points to is that the appellate courts 
would stop making law in the unfamiliar field, which would 
undermine the value of generalist appellate judges.245 
 
 240. As indicated above, the Tax Court is the forum of choice for over 95 percent of the tens 
of thousands of federal tax cases docketed at the trial level. See supra note 1 and accompanying 
text. The courts of appeals hear comparatively few tax cases. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
DIRECTOR, tbl.B-1A (2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/Judicial
Business/2012/appendices/B01ASep12.pdf (showing 143 tax cases pending as of Oct. 1, 2011, 
and 120 tax cases pending as of Sept. 30, 2012). Court of appeals judges may nonetheless 
develop some familiarity with tax law over time, as they serve on panels. See Daniel P. Currie & 
Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Quest for the 
Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13 (1975) (“One of thirty district judges in a circuit can 
expect to hear no more than 3 percent of the total caseload in any field; one of nine appellate 
judges will hear 33 percent of that caseload.”). 
 241. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization, 58 DUKE L.J. 
1667, 1676 (2009) (“What commentators generally mean when they talk about expertise seems 
to be the possibility that expertise will enhance the quality of court decisions: more expert 
judges, who know more about the field in which they are deciding cases, are more likely to get 
decisions right.”); Currie & Goodman, supra note 240, at 67 (“It is obvious that concentrated 
experience in handling a particular category of cases facilitates understanding.”). 
 242. Oldfather, supra note 209, at 357. Oldfather cites several situations involving 
deferential review, including administrative law questions subject to the Chevron doctrine. See 
id. Although he points to tax as a subject area in which appellate courts might feel they lack 
subject-matter expertise, id. at 365 n.217, he does not cite or discuss the Dobson case. However, 
Oldfather’s proposal entails a more limited form of deference than the Dobson rule did, 
particularly in that his proposal makes deference discretionary. See id. at 360–61 (discussing the 
benefits of percolation and the risks of discretion in this context). 
 243. Id. at 365 n.217. 
 244. Id. at 365. 
 245. Id. at 365 n.217. 
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Even in tax cases, there is a strong argument for incorporating 
the views of generalist judges.246 In part, that is because specialized 
judging carries (perhaps underappreciated) risks of what Professor 
Lawrence Baum terms “assertiveness, insularity, and stereotyping.”247 
Assertiveness in this context means overconfidence that might make 
specialty-court judges “more willing to overturn administrative 
decisions . . . [or] make sweeping decisions that change policy 
substantially.”248 Generalist judges may be more likely to focus on 
what Congress intended or to defer to expert agencies.249  
Insularity entails the risk that specialized judges will, among 
other things, “accord less authority to their superiors [such as higher-
court judges] than do generalists because they see generalist superiors 
as less knowledgeable than themselves.”250 This could mean that 
specialized judges give less weight to appellate precedents than would 
generalist trial court judges. In addition, it is much more likely for 
litigants to perceive a single specialty court as biased than for them to 
blame multiple, geographically dispersed generalist courts.251 The 
issue of perceived procedural fairness is an important process value.252 
Stereotyping in this context means “ascrib[ing] the attributes of 
past cases to current cases” and thus seeing them less objectively.253 
This could make a seasoned Tax Court judge less objective, for 
 
 246. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 240, at 68–70 (identifying several risks associated 
with specialized courts, including the possibility that they may attract lower-quality judges than 
do generalist courts). 
 247. Baum, supra note 241, at 1677. 
 248. Id.; see also Currie & Goodman, supra note 240, at 71 (“One possibility is that, as 
[specialized judges] come to know more and more about the subject—or from the outset if 
chosen because of prior knowledge—the judges may increasingly substitute their judgment for 
that of the agency in which Congress has vested discretion.”).  
 249. See Robert N. Miller, The Courts of Last Resort in Tax Cases: A Specialized Court of 
Tax Appeals?, 40 A.B.A. J. 563, 566 (1954) (“[F]inished statutory provisions are found to 
deviate at various points from the advice of experts, reflecting instead the views of constituents, 
politicians, and of the public generally. A court, of course, needs to follow the will of 
Congress—not to bring the statute back to where experts would like to see it.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 250. Baum, supra note 241, at 1678. 
 251. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 240, at 72 (noting that it is much easier to blame a 
single court that “frustrates a popular administrative program” than it is to blame multiple, 
dispersed circuit courts). 
 252. See Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens To Assess the 
Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 104 (1988) (“It is clear from [previous] 
research that citizen assessments of the justice of the procedures used by legal authorities to 
make decisions influence reactions to those decisions.”). 
 253. Baum, supra note 241, at 1678. 
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example, about whether a particular transaction is abusive or an 
argument in a particular case is frivolous. By contrast, a generalist 
judge not only may have “the outsider’s unprejudiced vision,”254 but 
also may enjoy a broader perspective and draw on analogies from 
other areas of law.255 
Even assuming, however, that none of these risks materializes in 
Tax Court cases and that Tax Court judges’ tax expertise gives them 
an advantage over generalist judges in deciding issues of tax law in 
the first instance, that does not establish whether the courts of 
appeals should be able to take a meaningful second look at those 
questions.256 Professor Richard Fallon has argued that “adequately 
searching appellate review of the judgments of legislative courts and 
administrative agencies is both necessary and sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of [A]rticle III.”257 At a minimum, meaningful Article 
III appellate review of an Article I court’s decisions helps promote 
the values underlying Article III, such as avoiding politically 
motivated decisionmaking.258 An analogous set of specialized Article I 
courts, the bankruptcy courts, generally have their decisions on legal 
issues reviewed de novo.259 
 
 254. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 240, at 69 (offering the example that “[a] 
specialized court made up of experts in the art of marine navigation would surely have been less 
likely than was the generalist Learned Hand to find the whole industry remiss in failing to adopt 
the radio”). 
 255. See id. at 68 (“To put blinders on judges and confine them to narrow compartments not 
only creates the risk of significant disuniformities but also enhances the danger that issues may 
be resolved on the basis of ignorance as to past experience in related fields.”).  
 256. If support for tax experts as the decisionmakers is pushed to its limit, it raises the 
question of how the generalist courts of appeals can ever identify errors that warrant reversal 
(although they surely can). See Brooklyn Nat’l Corp. v. Comm’r, 157 F.2d 450, 452–53 (2d Cir. 
1946). On this topic, Judge Learned Hand wrote:  
[F]inality [of Tax Court decisions] depends, as we understand, upon the added 
competency which inevitably follows from concentration in a special field. Why, if 
that be so, we—or indeed even the Supreme Court itself—should be competent to fix 
the measure of the Tax Court’s competence, and why we should ever declare that it is 
wrong, is indeed an interesting inquiry, which happily it is not necessary for us to 
pursue. 
Id. 
 257. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 918 (1988).  
 258. See id. at 947 (“Appellate review can provide an effective check against politically 
influenced adjudication, arbitrary and self-interested decision-making, and other evils that the 
separation of powers was designed to prevent.”). 
 259. See 1 THOMAS J. SALERNO & JORDAN A. KROOP, BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION AND 
PRACTICE: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE § 3.18, at 3-73 (4th ed. Supp. 2012) (noting that in 
bankruptcy cases, “[a]ll conclusions of law (in both core and non-core matters) are reviewed de 
novo”).  
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In addition, the context in which the courts of appeals conduct 
their review is very relevant. First, appellate courts can begin their 
legal inquiry without having to do the legwork of compiling the 
factual record.260 Second, they have the benefit of both the Tax 
Court’s legal analysis and the parties’ appellate briefs, which distill 
the issues261 and point out areas of disagreement with the Tax Court’s 
legal reasoning. That means that the appellate court benefits from a 
narrow focus on well-analyzed disputed issues. In addition, the 
appellate court consists not of a single judge but of a three-judge 
panel in which each judge benefits from the others’ perspectives.262 All 
of these factors support allowing the courts of appeals to conduct the 
same level of review of Tax Court decisions as they do of district 
court decisions. 
The larger purposes of appellate review also warrant 
consideration. Recall that the question is not whether the specialized 
judges at the Tax Court should get to decide questions of law. Rather, 
the question is whether the courts of appeals should be entitled to 
conduct a review of the Tax Court’s answers to legal questions or 
instead should be constrained to “rubber-stamp” them in most cases. 
Given that context, the fact that deference to the trial judge 
“undermines [the] ‘legitimating’ function of appellate review” is a 
strong argument against such deference.263 That is, meaningful 
appellate review supports procedural fairness.264 And it does so 
without in any way detracting from the expertise applied by the Tax 
Court at the trial level. 
In fact, as far as perceived fairness is concerned, specialized trial 
courts benefit even more than generalist courts from appellate review 
because specialized courts are particularly subject to accusations of 
bias.265 A major reason for such perceptions of bias is that, as a 
 
 260. See Coenen, supra note 202, at 923 (“The facts of the case, for all practical purposes, 
are settled on appeal.”). 
 261. Id. 
 262. See supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text. 
 263. Coenen, supra note 202, at 940–41. 
 264. See Tyler, supra note 252, at 105 (listing among potential procedural-justice criteria 
“[c]orrectability,” meaning “the existence of opportunities to correct unfair or inaccurate 
decisions”); cf. id. at 125–27 (finding in an empirical, survey-based study in Chicago that 
“citizens dealing with the courts were more concerned with issues of decision quality, bias, and 
correctability than were those dealing with the police”). 
 265. The Tax Court is no stranger to bias accusations. Professor James Maule has carefully 
catalogued the articles accusing the Tax Court of bias in favor of the government and conducted 
his own empirical study to refute them. See generally James Edward Maule, Instant Replay, 
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structural matter, specialized courts are more easily targeted by 
interest groups.266 Meaningful appellate review by nonspecialists 
mitigates that structural problem. And that is particularly true for the 
Tax Court, which lacks routine oversight outside of the appellate 
review process267 because—unlike the district courts268 and the Court 
of Federal Claims269—the Tax Court is neither served nor overseen by 
the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts and the U.S. Judicial 
Conference.270 
2. Decentralization of Tax Litigation.  One of the distinctive 
features of tax litigation is that multiple trial courts hear federal tax 
cases, and litigants often may choose among them. Although the Tax 
Court hears the overwhelming majority of these cases, taxpayers who 
pay a claimed deficiency in full and meet the other jurisdictional 
prerequisites can sue in either a federal district court or the Court of 
Federal Claims.271 Moreover, whereas an appeal by the same taxpayer 
in a Tax Court or district court case will generally be brought to the 
 
Weak Teams, and Disputed Calls: An Empirical Study of Alleged Tax Court Judge Bias, 66 
TENN. L. REV. 351 (1999). 
 266. See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 202, at 145 (“Courts become more attractive targets for 
special interest groups as their jurisdiction is narrowed.”); Baum, supra note 241, at 1679 
(“Interest groups gain a better opportunity to influence judges who hear only a narrow set of 
cases.”). 
 267. See Lederman, supra note 8, at 1215. 
 268. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/AdministrativeOffice.
aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (“[T]he Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) 
serves the federal Judiciary.”); Judicial Conference of the United States, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) 
(“District judges were formally added to the Conference in 1957.”). 
 269. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 270. See S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 304 n.3 (1969) (“The committee amendments do not place 
the Tax Court under the supervision of the Judicial Conference or the Director of the 
Administrative Office of the Article III courts or give them any power or control over the Tax 
Court.”). The Director of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts has statutory duties to 
perform under the supervision of the U.S. Judicial Conference. See 28 U.S.C. § 604(a) (2012) 
(listing dozens of duties, including to “[p]erform such other duties as may be assigned to him by 
the Supreme Court or the Judicial Conference of the United States”); see also id. § 605 (“The 
Director, under the supervision of the Judicial Conference of the United States, shall submit to 
the Office of Management and Budget annual estimates of the expenditures and appropriations 
necessary for the maintenance and operation of the courts and the Administrative Office and 
the operation of the judicial survivors annuity fund . . . .”). 
 271. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). 
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same court of appeals,272 an appeal from the Court of Federal Claims 
is heard in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.273 
Some scholars dislike the forum-shopping opportunities this 
institutional structure creates and have argued in favor of 
consolidating trial-level jurisdiction in the Tax Court274 and/or 
creating a national Court of Tax Appeals.275 Each of these options 
would have costs and benefits.276 Consolidation of trial-level tax 
jurisdiction would remove the possibility of forum shopping, but at 
the expense of eliminating the taxpayer’s option to sue in a generalist 
court.277 Specialized courts can become somewhat insular, and the Tax 
 
 272. See I.R.C. § 7482(b) (providing a venue for appeals from Tax Court decisions); 28 
U.S.C. § 1294 (providing a venue for appeals from district court decisions). 
 273. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 
 274. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. 
REV. 634, 644 n.38 (1974) (supporting the idea of consolidating trial-level tax litigation in an 
Article III Tax Court); Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 731, 789 (2002) (endorsing the idea of giving the Tax Court exclusive trial-
level jurisdiction); Stanley S. Surrey, Some Suggested Topics in the Field of Tax Administration, 
25 WASH. U. L.Q. 399, 417–22 (1940) (arguing in support of a proposal advanced by then-
Professor Roger Traynor); Roger John Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for 
Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxes—A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1393, 
1425–28 (1938) (proposing consolidation of trial-level tax cases in a reorganized, decentralized 
Board coupled with a proposal for a Court of Tax Appeals). 
 275. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 274, at 644 (proposing a Court of Tax Appeals); Gans, 
supra note 274, at 789–90 (mentioning the possible consolidation of appellate tax jurisdiction in 
a new court); Griswold, supra note 83, at 1164–66 (arguing for a Court of Tax Appeals); Surrey, 
supra note 274, at 417–22 (same); Traynor, supra note 274, at 1425–28 (same).  
 276. One of the main arguments advanced in favor of consolidation of tax jurisdiction, 
particularly at the appellate level, is the increased speed in reaching an answer on what the law 
is on a particular issue. See Miller, supra note 249, at 563. Miller, a former Solicitor of the 
Revenue for the Bureau of Internal Revenue (equivalent to Chief Counsel of the IRS), argues, 
however, that a Court of Tax Appeals would not eliminate many of the causes of uncertainty 
and lengthy litigation. See id. at 563–64. Early empirical studies supported that view. See 
Madaline Kinter Remmlein, A Time Study of Certain Tax Controversies, 16 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 238, 250 (1948) (concluding that “[t]he Supreme Court and the circuit court stages 
consume only a small part of the total time a tax controversy is under consideration”); Madaline 
Kinter Remmlein, Tax Controversies—Where Goes the Time?, 13 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 416, 
431–32 (1945) (“Since the Supreme Court takes less than five months on the cases it reviews, 
and the circuit courts take about nine months, the bulk of the seven or eight years which is 
apparently required to settle the average tax issue (in cases which get to the Supreme Court) 
must be consumed below the appellate stage.”). 
 277. See Melvin A. Coffee, Tax Court Should Not Be the Sole Forum for Tax Disputes, 41 
TAX NOTES 777, 777 (1988) (“[R]ecent years have seen the appearance of a lessening of even-
handed justice in the United States Tax Court and . . . forcing all litigation to that Court would 
not be wise.”). 
LEDERMAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2014  9:16 AM 
2014] (UN)APPEALING DEFERENCE 1887 
Court has at times behaved in ways that depart from judicial norms.278 
Other federal trial courts’ tax opinions can provide valuable 
information about other approaches to the trial of tax cases. In 
addition, giving taxpayers a choice of fora, including the generalist 
district courts, can provide the Tax Court with an incentive to keep its 
behavior in line with that of other courts.279 
A Court of Tax Appeals would increase the insularity of the tax-
litigation process in two ways. First, it would remove the Tax Court’s 
oversight by generalist courts and thus lessen the Tax Court’s 
exposure to those norms. Second, it would itself be a specialized 
body. That would not only raise all of the concerns about specialty 
courts discussed above,280 it would also encourage the development of 
tax-specific rules281 and increase the magnitude of the harm from an 
incorrect decision.282 Such a powerful specialized court would also be 
susceptible to interest-group pressures.283 Even if neither of these 
things happened, a specialized court would risk accusations of bias 
that would undermine its perceived fairness.284 
 
 278. See Lederman, supra note 8, at 1217–32 (describing several incidents evincing a lack of 
transparency in contexts in which transparency is expected of courts); cf. Currie & Goodman, 
supra note 240, at 70 (“The more important the administrative program, the greater the dangers 
of giving sole power over it to a single court.”). 
 279. Cf. Montgomery B. Angell, Procedural Reform in the Judicial Review of Controversies 
Under the Internal Revenue Statutes: An Answer to a Proposal, 34 ILL. L. REV. 151, 154 (1939) 
(“At the present time, if a taxpayer has cause for complaint about the Board [of Tax Appeals], 
he knows that in the next case which he may have he can pay the deficiency and bring suit 
before his local district judge.”). 
 280. See supra notes 246–55 and accompanying text. 
 281. See Kalman A. Goldring, Integration of the Tax Court into the Federal Judicial System, 
25 TAXES 445, 448 (1947) (arguing that a Court of Tax Appeals would “segregate further the tax 
‘specialist’ from the general practitioner; and . . . add to the development of peculiar concepts 
applicable only in taxation and not in the general law of the land”). 
 282. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 240, at 69–70 (“Dispersion of jurisdiction among 
several courts not only assures that a number of judges may contribute their judgment to the 
solution of difficult problems; it also vastly reduces the potential of a single wrong decision to 
harm an administrative program or those subject to it.”). 
 283. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. Interest groups, could, for example, try to 
influence the nomination of judges by serving on bar committees that recommend or review 
nominees. Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1148–49 (1990). 
 284. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 240, at 72 (“If a single court frustrates a popular 
administrative program, it is natural for those disappointed to blame judicial bias; the finger 
cannot so easily be pointed where responsibility is shared by eleven circuit courts.”); Steve R. 
Johnson, Reforming Federal Tax Litigation: An Agenda, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 205, 254 (2013) 
(“Suspicion of the fairness of specialized tax tribunals is too widespread to be ignored. 
Confidence in the system is too important to risk.”). 
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A Court of Tax Appeals would also be an exception to the 
general approach of providing coequal appellate courts that lack 
“intercircuit stare decisis,”285 which, as Professor Richard Revesz has 
observed, serves important purposes, including providing information 
to the Supreme Court.286 In addition, if the refund-litigation path 
continued to exist, a Court of Tax Appeals “would separate the tax 
judicial system almost completely from the general federal judicial 
system and give a greater bonus to the possession of sufficient wealth 
to allow a choice of tribunals.”287 
Regardless of the costs and benefits of a consolidated tax-
litigation process, however, the existing structure is long-standing, 
and there seems to be no current impetus to change it. So, the 
question becomes whether the decentralization of tax litigation 
counsels a deviation from the normal model of appellate review. 
Once again, the deviation under consideration is whether the 
courts of appeals should defer to the Tax Court on issues of law, and 
perhaps also on mixed questions of fact and law.288 One commentator, 
 
 285. Revesz, supra note 283, at 1156. 
 286. See id. at 1155–59 (explaining the benefits of differing outcomes in the courts of 
appeals). 
 287. Goldring, supra note 281, at 448. 
 288. Outside the Tax Court context, the Supreme Court has explained that the standard of 
review applicable to mixed questions of fact and law depends on the relative competencies of 
trial courts and the appellate courts: 
In deference to the unchallenged superiority of the district court’s factfinding ability, 
Rule 52(a) commands that a trial court’s findings of fact “shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.” . . . [W]e have held that deferential review 
of mixed questions of law and fact is warranted when it appears that the district court 
is “better positioned” than the appellate court to decide the issue in question or that 
probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine.  
Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 52; Miller v. 
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).  
  The Court has also stated with respect to a “materiality” issue that “the 
characterization of a mixed question of law and fact for one purpose does not govern its 
characterization for all purposes.” United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522 (1995). The Court 
explained: 
It is hard to imagine questions more diverse than, on the one hand, whether an 
appellate court must remand to a district court for a determination of materiality in a 
denaturalization proceeding (Kungys) and, on the other hand, whether the 
Constitution requires the finding of the element of materiality in a criminal 
prosecution to be made by the jury (the present case). 
Id. (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988)). More recently, the Court stated that 
“deferential” review applies when “the mix weighs heavily on the ‘fact’ side.” Brown v. Plata, 
131 S. Ct. 1910, 1932 (2011) (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 148 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment)) (quotation marks omitted). 
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Hugh Bickford, writing in the Dobson era, strenuously argued that 
such deference would undermine Congress’s intent in making the Tax 
Court an additional option for tax litigation, not one that supplanted 
existing courts: 
The primary purpose of the creation of the Board was to remove the 
adjudication of tax disputes from control of the Treasury 
Department and to give the taxpayer his “day in court” with full 
right of appeal to the highest court of the land. This was not a 
“limitation” or “restriction” upon judicial review; it was a right 
expressly granted by Congress. It was a broadening of the judicial 
power. The only limitation intended was upon the executive branch 
of the Government.289 
In addition, although it might initially seem that deference would 
increase uniformity in tax decisions, quite the opposite is true. 
Deference would foster a certain level of finality of Tax Court 
decisions, but it would actually decrease uniformity with district court 
decisions. If a district court case and a Tax Court case on the same 
issue were decided the same way and both were appealed to the same 
court of appeals, the court of appeals could reverse the district court 
if it thought there were a better legal answer, but it could not reverse 
the Tax Court. 
Furthermore, since 1970, the Tax Court has applied the 
precedent of the court of appeals to which the appeal would lie, 
assuming that precedent is squarely on point.290 If deference were 
added to the mix, it would mean that a court of appeals could 
effectively have to defer to itself or a sister circuit,291 essentially 
ossifying positions that the circuit court might have since rethought. It 
 
 289. Bickford, supra note 36, at 486. Bickford supported his argument with a detailed 
historical analysis. See id. at 485–90. 
 290. Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), aff’d on other grounds, 445 F.2d 985 (10th 
Cir. 1971). 
 291. A case decided in the Dobson era helps illustrate the problems this could cause even in 
the absence of Golsen. The Court of Appeals there stated: 
  There remains only the vexed question whether we should yield our own 
judgment to that of the Tax Court. . . . [T]he Tax Court’s decision was altogether 
based upon an interpretation of the decisions of the Supreme Court, and of the circuit 
courts of appeal . . . . We cannot believe . . . that even such specialists as the judges of 
[the Tax Court] are to be deemed in a better position to interpret the meaning of 
novices than the novices themselves: rather the opposite. Yet, what this appeal in the 
end comes down to is whether “lay judges”—so to say—shall determine the meaning 
of other “lay judges” without weighting the scales in favor of an earlier decision of 
“expert judges.” 
Comm’r v. Nat’l Carbide Corp., 167 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1948) (footnote omitted) (citing 
Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489 (1943)), aff’d., 336 U.S. 422 (1949). 
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is also not clear what a court of appeals would do if the Tax Court 
invalidated a Treasury regulation that the court of appeals would 
have upheld under Chevron. Would the court defer to Treasury, 
under Chevron, or to the Tax Court?292 
Moreover, deferring to the Tax Court would mean that the 
courts of appeals would have one standard of review for Tax Court 
decisions and another for district court decisions. In fact, the standard 
of review for Tax Court decisions would likely differ from the 
standard applied in all refund cases, including those decided by the 
Court of Federal Claims. Those differences would exist because it is 
unlikely that the appellate review model would be abandoned for less 
specialized courts. Even Dobson, for example, spoke only of 
deference to Tax Court decisions.293 
Such a difference in the treatment of appeals from the Tax Court 
and the other trial courts would reduce uniformity of case outcomes. 
In addition, given that taxpayers can choose where to litigate, such 
distinct treatment might affect where tax cases are docketed. 
Taxpayers who value meaningful review might increasingly favor the 
refund fora. Because only taxpayers who can afford to pay the 
deficiency in advance would have that forum choice, differential 
treatment of appeals would increase wealth-based disparities.294 
Thus, decentralization of tax trials undermines, rather than 
supports, the deference rationale. That might suggest that the answer 
is to consolidate the existing structure of tax litigation as much as 
possible. Of course, consolidation would raise the insularity and other 
concerns mentioned above.295 And, perversely, deference would be of 
little use in a consolidated system of tax trials and appeals. Recall that 
Justice Jackson viewed deference to Tax Court decisions as a second-
best approach to his goal of expediting tax-case outcomes.296 In a 
system with the Tax Court serving as the only trial-level forum and a 
 
 292. See Johnson, supra note 108, at 285 (noting that if the Tax Court invalidated a 
regulation and the government appealed that decision, “the court of appeals would have to 
choose which master to serve,” and observing that “[p]redictability and certainty in application 
of the tax laws would not be furthered by creating such a conflict”). 
 293. See Dobson, 320 U.S. at 501–02. 
 294. See Review—Tax Court Decisions, supra note 139, at 611–12 (describing how, under 
Dobson, “[t]he ‘rich man,’ it was said, could, by paying the deficiency, by-pass the Tax Court 
and limited review, while the ‘poor man,’ seeking to contest a deficiency before payment, could 
look forward only to limited review”). 
 295. See supra notes 247–55 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
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national Court of Tax Appeals as the sole reviewing body, there 
would be no circuit splits on tax issues. Moreover, in such a system, 
the appellate body would have as much expertise as the Tax Court, 
eliminating one of the principal rationales for deference. 
3. “Tax Is Different.”  Another possible reason for deviating 
from the appellate review model is the notion that tax cases are 
different from other cases. The Dobson rule was a manifestation of 
that notion—Justice Jackson thought that finality was more important 
than accuracy in tax cases.297 Justice Jackson’s approach has 
superficial appeal because some issues, such as the timing questions 
he discussed in print before joining the Court,298 present a 
coordination problem, much like the question of which side of the 
road everyone should drive on. What is most important in those cases 
is that the law be applied consistently. However, other issues may 
involve a determination of whether a particular receipt is taxed at all, 
or whether a particular expense is ever deductible. Particularly when 
Congress had a particular intent or was trying to promote a specific 
policy, it is more important to have a thoughtful answer than just 
some uniform rule.299 
The general reason underlying tax exceptionalism is the 
complexity of the tax law, a contention that Part III.B.1 argued was 
unavailing, given the role of appellate review as a legitimizing second 
look that builds on and benefits from the Tax Court’s expertise.300 
There are also compelling reasons to avoid distinct treatment of tax 
cases. Isolating the tax law from other areas of law may stunt the 
development of the tax law301 and impede the ability of tax lawyers 
 
 297. See Stark, supra note 50, at 207 (arguing that Justice Jackson considered the goal of tax 
litigation to be “to facilitate a clean and quick resolution of legal controversies”); see also 
Dobson, 320 U.S. at 499 (referring to “[c]onsideration[s] of uniform and expeditious tax 
administrations” and stating that “diversification of appellate authority inevitably produces 
conflict of decision”). 
 298. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 299. See Smith, supra note 22, at 377 (“When a tax controversy relates to a tax law which is 
intended to promote a specific public policy or policies, it is more important that the issue be 
settled correctly than merely settled.”). 
 300. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 301. See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax 
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518 (1994) (“[T]ax law too often is mistakenly viewed by 
lawyers, judges, and law professors as a self-contained body of law. . . . [T]his misperception has 
impaired the development of tax law by shielding it from other areas of law that should inform 
the tax debate.”); Hickman, supra note 236, at 1541 (“[T]he emphasis of the existing scholarship 
on the uniqueness of the tax field—and the resulting complexity that this focus has added to 
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and other lawyers to learn from each other.302 Currently, tax 
exceptionalism seems to be on the wane, not the rise.303 The Supreme 
Court recently brought tax administration more in line with other 
areas of administrative law when it held that Treasury regulations are 
to be accorded Chevron deference (not deference under the tax-
specific rule of National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States304), 
stating, “In the absence of . . . justification, we are not inclined to 
carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law 
only.”305 Accordingly, a vague notion that tax is different from other 
areas of the law is not a sufficient reason to depart from general 
norms of appellate review.306  
In addition, a Dobson-like deference rule would not really 
provide finality. Not only does Dobson have an exception for 
mistakes of law,307 but taxpayers would be able to avoid its application 
by bringing their cases in either of the other two trial fora that hear 
 
what otherwise should be a fairly simple analysis—are emblematic of a perception of tax 
exceptionalism that intrudes upon much contemporary tax scholarship and jurisprudence.”). 
 302. See, e.g., Angell, supra note 279, at 155 (“The tax law should be moulded into and made 
an integral part of our jurisprudence, and not segregated into a separate, water-tight 
compartment.”); Caron, supra note 301, at 518 (“This Article advocates a synergistic 
relationship between tax and nontax law through which each benefits from the insights of the 
other.”); Leandra Lederman, “Civil”izing Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning to 
Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183, 183 (1996) (“Tax law tends to be 
uninformed by other areas of law. This insularity has the unfortunate consequence of depriving 
tax and other fields of cross-fertilization.” (footnote omitted)). 
 303. See Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 
VA. TAX REV. 269, 279 (2012) (“[T]he Mayo Court disposed of tax exceptionalism, the notion 
that tax administration is exempt from the rules governing other areas of regulation.”). 
 304. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979). 
 305. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011). 
The court went on to write, “The principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply with full 
force in the tax context.” Id. 
 306. In addition, some of the ways in which the Tax Court is different—for example, its 
specialized nature and its Article I status—support meaningful review by the Article III courts 
of appeals. See supra notes 257–59, 265–70 and accompanying text. 
 307. See Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943) (“[W]hen the court cannot separate 
the elements of a decision so as to identify a clear-cut mistake of law, the decision of the Tax 
Court must stand.”). Johnson explains with respect to Shores’s proposal to resurrect Dobson: 
Shores’ version of deference is not absolute. There are at least three significant 
qualifications in his proposal: (1) deference to the Tax Court’s view would be 
required only in cases on appeal from the Tax Court, not those on appeal from other 
trial courts; (2) deference would not be required in certain situations even in cases on 
appeal from the Tax Court; and (3) despite deference, the court of appeals still could 
reverse if it found the Tax Court’s view lacking any reasonable basis.  
Johnson, supra note 108, at 256 (footnotes omitted). 
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federal tax cases. This might increase litigation in those courts, the 
decisions of which are not subject to appellate deference. 
Moreover, in a sense, Justice Jackson’s goal of having the Tax 
Court have the last word in a large number of tax cases has already 
come to pass.308 In 1969, Congress created the small tax case (S case) 
procedure,309 an elective procedure allowing for simplified 
proceedings.310 Decisions in S cases are not appealable.311 The 
jurisdictional limit for S cases has become so high ($50,000 per tax 
year in issue312) that approximately half of the cases docketed in Tax 
Court elect S status.313 The result is finality in a high percentage of 
decisions. This does not preclude future litigation of the same types of 
issues—decisions in S cases have no precedential value314—but it 
allows many taxpayers to avoid appellate litigation.315  
Thus, from a policy perspective, heightened appellate court 
deference to Tax Court decisions is completely unwarranted. Rather, 
the goals of appellate review are furthered as much in the tax context 
as in other contexts by allowing the courts of appeals to review Tax 
Court decisions on appeal for errors of law and clearly erroneous 
findings of fact. 
 
 308. The author thanks Keith Fogg for this point. 
 309. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 957(a), 83 Stat. 487, 733 (adding 
I.R.C. § 7463). 
 310. See I.R.C. § 7463(a) (2012) (“[A]t the option of the taxpayer concurred in by the Tax 
Court or a division thereof before the hearing of the case, proceedings in the case shall be 
conducted under this section. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7453, such proceedings 
shall be conducted in accordance with such rules of evidence, practice, and procedure as the Tax 
Court may prescribe.”).  
 311. Id. § 7463(b). 
 312. Id. § 7463(a). The previous $10,000 limit was changed to $50,000 in 1998. See Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, § 3103(a), 112 Stat. 
685, 731.  
 313. For example, in fiscal year 2010, 14,997 of 29,489 cases docketed in the Tax Court 
(50.86%) were S cases; in 2011, 14,786 of 29,693 cases docketed (49.80%) were S cases; and in 
2012, 16,124 of 31,282 cases (51.54%) were S cases. OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, supra note 1, at 
13. 
 314. I.R.C. § 7463(b). 
 315. This helps reduce wealth-based barriers to litigation, as does the fact that the simplified 
S case procedures may be more accessible to pro se taxpayers than more formal procedures are. 
In S cases, most taxpayers proceed pro se. See OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, supra note 1, at 13 
(showing that, in fiscal year 2010, 13,747 of 14,997 S cases involved pro se taxpayers; in 2011, 
13,483 of 14,786 did; and in 2012, 14,723 of 16,124 did). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s Dobson opinion brings to mind the words 
of Judge Friendly, who wrote, regarding a forum non conveniens case 
in which the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and called 
for deference to the district court: 
The Supreme Court treated the case as if the court of appeals had 
been reviewing the action of an administrative agency, where indeed 
a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment. But that is because, 
paying proper heed to the separation of powers, Congress has so 
directed. In contrast, the district judge and the judges of the court of 
appeals wear the same robes.316 
Professor William Eskridge has cautioned against romanticizing 
institutions.317 Justice Jackson seemingly did just that in Dobson, 
identifying the Tax Court as the administrative body to which courts 
should defer in tax cases. His reason for doing so was apparently 
largely instrumental—he wanted to reduce the volume of tax 
litigation.318 Although before his appointment to the Supreme Court, 
Jackson had argued in writing that Congress should address this 
concern,319 as a Supreme Court Justice, he apparently considered it 
within the purview of the judiciary. Randolph Paul, a tax adviser at 
Treasury, accordingly commented: 
There is one striking difference between Mr. Justice Jackson’s 
comments as a writer and his subsequent observations as a judge. 
The former treat problems of tax administration and adjudication as 
matters calling for legislative solution; the latter place the same 
problems, with some limitations, within the province of judicial 
policy as well.320 
Put bluntly, the Dobson opinion was a disaster. It has been justly 
criticized as poorly reasoned and misguided. One wonders whether 
the Court would have explicitly overruled Dobson by now had 
 
 316. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 753 (1982); see 
also id. at 749 (“In effect [the Supreme Court] directed the court of appeals to step aside and 
restore the judgment of the district court.”). 
 317. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative 
Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 
2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 432 (“One of the most important Komesarian insights is that 
comparative institutional analysis must avoid the tendency to romanticize institutions.”). 
 318. See supra Part I.B. 
 319. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 320. Paul, supra note 82, at 760 n.30. 
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Congress not acted long ago. But Congress did act, first in 1948, at 
least cabining the Dobson rule. If Congress’s actions were ambiguous, 
part of the blame may lie with its misunderstanding of the less-than-
clear Dobson opinion.321 However, lawyers at the time and Justice 
Jackson himself seemed to regard Congress’s action as overturning 
Dobson. 
Regardless, if a vestige of deferential review remained in 1948, it 
does not and should not remain today. In 1969, Congress officially 
made the Tax Court a court of law, eliminating its vestigial status as 
an executive-branch agency. This was an additional action by 
Congress that undermined the Dobson Court’s attempt to treat the 
Tax Court like an administrative agency. And if any of Dobson’s 
statutory interpretation survived both of those changes, the Supreme 
Court has since put Dobson to rest with its post-amendment 
interpretation of I.R.C. § 7482. In 1991, the Court stated that the 
standard of review applicable to Tax Court decisions is the same as 
that applicable to district court decisions, and it contrasted that 
standard with review of agency rulemaking.322 
Accordingly, the courts of appeals should disavow Dobson and 
its progeny and instead heed the statutory command to review Tax 
Court decisions in the same manner and to the same extent as district 
court decisions in nonjury cases. Such an approach supports the 
policies behind appellate review, including its legitimizing effect on 
trial court decisions. This approach also provides consistent standards 
for appellate review in all tax cases, rather than complicating 
appellate review by carving out Tax Court appeals for distinct 
treatment. 
 
 321. See supra Parts I.B–C. 
 322. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991). 
